2005-03-01

The China Fantasy

Here is an excerpt from the 2007 book
The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression
by James Mann.





[pages 66-67, the end of Chapter 3]

Foreign investment in China brings in huge new sources of money
to the emerging elites in China’s major cities.
It enriches
the Chinese consultants who provide advice to Western companies,
the Chinese entrepreneurs who start up new businesses,
and, often, the Communist Party cadres
who approve loans or grant licenses to Chinese business ventures
(which, not infrequently,
are run by the children or friends of the party cadres).
These elites need to keep Chinese wage levels low,
so that the foreign investors keep flooding into China.
They have an interest in repressing political dissent
so that the country looks quiet and stable to prospective investors.
Needless to say, the Chinese business elites strongly support
perpetuating the existing state of affairs for as long as possible.

Similarly, American elites are content with the status quo.

It enables American firms to shift manufacturing operations to China,
where labor costs are low
and corporate leaders don’t have to worry about
independent trade unions.

[Nor the need to provide their employees with super-expensive health insurance.]

To be sure, the American and Chinese business elites
do not always see eye to eye.
American companies sometimes complain that
their Chinese partners are ripping off their designs
or diverting money from a joint venture.
The Chinese executives complain that
Americans fail to understand China’s culture
or the intricate ways in which the Chinese system works.
But these are disputes over business operations.
In the larger sense, the Chinese and American elites
share a common interest in the existing economic order, in which
China serves as
the world’s low-wage, high-volume
all-purpose manufacturing center.


Thus, on the surface it looks as if
middle-class Americans are identifying with middle-class Chinese,
dreaming that the Chinese, too,
will one day insist on a choice of political candidates
the way they are now able to select from
a range of lattes and mochas at Starbucks.
Look beneath the surface, however,
and you will find a more troubling reality.
The business communities of China and the United States
do not harbor these dreams of democracy.
Both profit from a Chinese system that permits no political opposition,
and—for now, at least—both are content with it.

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The Race to the Bottom (Tonelson)

Here are some excerpts from the 2000 book
The Race To The Bottom:
Why A Worldwide Worker Surplus And Uncontrolled Free Trade
Are Sinking American Living Standards

by Alan Tonelson.
The emphasis is added.



Chapter 7
False Hopes



[7.0.1]
Probably the most important tenet
of the Hippocratic Oath that all medical doctors take
is the first.
Do no harm.
This refreshing nod to modesty
is one that should be heeded by more economic policymakers,
especially since they undoubtedly know less about
the domestic and world economies
than physicians know about the human body.

[7.0.2]
Nothing, then, is more depressing than recognizing that
globalization enthusiasts inside and outside government
seem unaware of this cardinal rule.
Not only do they have no clue how to head off
the crack-ups looming ahead for
American society, the U.S. economy, and the global economy
thanks to their policies,
but they also seem determined to bring them on sooner.
Slightly less depressing is that
many of the most perceptive critics of current globalization policies—
including those who have insightfully decried the race to the bottom—
have lined up behind a series of policy alternatives
that could bring the same kinds of results.

[7.0.3]
The crack-ups will not be averted unless Americans understand
what lies behind the world economy’s dangerous imbalances.
The race to the bottom is only the worst and most important symptom,
not the cause of the global economy’s problems.
The race is being run in the first place
because
it is rewarded so lavishly by the way the world economy is set up.
The main interlocking mechanisms for generating these rewards are

  1. the many and varied policies pursued by
    governments in the industrialized countries
    and by international organizations
    (and lobbied for enthusiastically by multinational corporations)
    to channel investment into
    the low-income countries of the third world; and

  2. wide-open access for these countries’ exports
    to the markets of the industrialized countries,
    chiefly the United States.


[7.0.4]
The investment has different effects in different types of third world countries,
and sometimes within the same country.
In the export superpowers located mainly in East Asia,
it builds the factories and supplies the infrastructure systems
that make possible the manufacture of almost endless floods of products—
most eventually headed fro final markets in Europe and the United States.
Because of the mercantilist policies practiced by these countries
and IMF financial constraints on many of them and numerous others,
the investment flows do not finance enough of the consumption
that would enable these countries to buy their share of these products themselves,
much less to consume their share of other countries’ goods.

[7.0.5]
In the less successful low-income countries located mainly in Latin America
(but now including Russia),
investments provided by the world economy
finance much export-oriented production.
However, much of this investment is simply stole or wasted by governments.
Some of it, to be sure, also finances consumption,
but even that modes level of consumption is more consumption
than the populations of these countries can sustain responsibly.
These populations cannot sustain much consumption because
most earn next to nothing,
which causes them to live either at the edge of debt or deeply in it.
In effect, these countries can import and consume
an appropriate share of their own and world output
only if they dramatically reduce their output,
or if they live far beyond their means.
Borrowers that splurge, however,
have the rug yanked out from under them all too regularly.
Further, because the world sends so much capital their way,
when rugs are yanked, financial crises result.

[7.0.6]
However, one more major imbalance bears responsibility
for the world’s dangerous financial instability today—
the outsized share of the world’s imports
(and especially the developing world’s imports)
taken by the United States.
It is true that,
given the sputtered-out national engines of domestic growth
in much of the world nowadays,
and given so many countries’ insistence on keeping their markets closed,
U.S. importing is almost single-handedly
keeping the rest of the planet afloat economically.
It is equally true, however,
that current levels of net importing
are driving down living standards in the United States,
that they are consequently driving down the real purchasing power
that makes significant, responsible levels of importing
sustainable to begin with,
and that this growing gap between U.S. purchasing power and U.S. imports
is bound to make the nation’s creditors
increasingly reluctant to continue financing these purchases.

[7.0.7]
Without a sustainable balance between production and consumption,
any economic system will sooner or later fall apart.
The race to the bottom is inexorably destroying this balance.
It is encouraging ever more production by countries and populations
that either will not consume or cannot consume for very long.
Unfortunately, the race is dependent on ever more consumption
by a population whose ability to support consumption with production
it is steadily sapping.






Section 7.A
Growing the Deficits



[7.A.1]
For decades, most U.S. leaders and economists responded to
concerns about U.S. trade deficits and international payments balances
with energetic ridicule....

[7.A.2]
Today,
some academic economists and think-tank types still pooh-pooh the deficits....




Section 7.B
If at First ...





Section 7.C
The New Welfare Lobby





Section 7.D
Trade Agreements with a Difference

Labels: , , ,

America's debt addiction

You load sixteen tons, and what do you get?
Another day older and deeper in debt.
Saint Peter, don’t you call me, ’cause I can’t go;
I owe my soul to the company store.

From a well-known song of the 1950s
(Wikipedia, Google);
hear the song
in its definitive rendition by Tennessee Ernie Ford
here.
To hear TEF sing all the lyrics, click here.













A generally useful book
dealing with geopolitical consequences of excessive debt is
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers by Paul Kennedy.



2004


2004-12-06-Roberts
Collapsing Case For Free Trade
By Paul Craig Roberts
The American Conservative, 2004-12-06







2008


2008-12-26-NYT-China
Chinese Savings Helped Inflate American Bubble
By MARK LANDLER
New York Times, 2008-12-26

“Usually it’s the rich country lending to the poor.
This time, it’s the poor country lending to the rich.”


[An excerpt; emphasis is added.]

By the yardsticks that appeared to matter most — prosperity and growth —
the relationship between China and the United States
seemed to be paying off for both countries.

Neither had a strong incentive to break an addiction:
China to strong export growth and financial stability;
the United States to cheap imports and low-cost foreign loans.





2008-12-28-NYT-Goodman
Printing Money – and Its Price
By PETER S. GOODMAN
New York Times Week in Review, 2008-12-28

[An excerpt; emphasis is added.]

Some argue that the moment for sobriety is long overdue,
and postponing it further only increases the ultimate costs.
“Our government doesn’t have enough spare cash
to bail out a lemonade stand,”

declared Peter Schiff, president of Euro Pacific Capital,
a Connecticut-based trading house.

“Our standard of living must decline
to reflect
years of reckless consumption and
the disintegration of our industrial base.
Only by swallowing this tough medicine now
will our sick economy ever recover.”









2009


2009-01-01-Ignatius
It's Time To Pay The Bills
By David Ignatius
Washington Post, 2009-01-01

[An excellent column.]



2009-01-30-NYT-Davos
Global Worries Over U.S. Stimulus Spending
By NELSON D. SCHWARTZ
New York Times, 2009-01-30

[Emphasis is added.]

DAVOS, Switzerland —

[1]
Even as Congress looks for ways to expand
President Obama’s $819 billion stimulus package,
the rest of the world is wondering how Washington will pay for it all.

[2]
Few people attending the World Economic Forum
question the need to kick-start America’s economy, the world’s largest,
with a package that could reach $1 trillion over two years.
But the long-term fallout from increased borrowing by the federal government,
and its potential to drive up inflation and interest rates around the world,
seems to be getting more attention here than in Washington.

[3]
“The U.S. needs to show some proof
they have a plan to get out of the fiscal problem,”

said Ernesto Zedillo, the former Mexican president
who helped steer his country through a financial crisis in 1994.
“We, as developing countries,
need to know we won’t be crowded out of the capital markets,
which is already happening.”

[4]
Mr. Zedillo said that Washington, unlike most other countries,
had the option of simply printing more money,
because the dollar was a reserve currency for the rest of the world.

[5]
Over the long run, that could force long-term interest rates higher
and drive down the value of the dollar,
undermining the benefits that come with its special status.

[6]
Until now, most fears about surging government debt have focused on
borrowing by European countries like Spain, Greece and especially Britain,
which is also in the midst of a sizable bank bailout.
That recently forced the British pound to a 23-year low against the dollar.

[7]
While the dollar’s status as refuge in a time of turmoil
should prevent that kind of sell-off for now,
a number of financial specialists warned that
if fundamental factors like
the lack of American savings and bloated budget deficits

did not change,
the dollar could eventually fall sharply.

[One would hope that it is not just the “financial specialists”
who are worring about those issues.
Unfortunately, much of the American public
puts short-term self-interest ahead of those long-term, general issues.]


[8]
“There aren’t that many safe havens,”
said Alan S. Blinder, a Princeton economist
who is a former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve in Washington,
explaining why the dollar’s status as a reserve currency
is unlikely to be threatened.

[9]
Instead,
it is the dollar’s long-term value against other currencies
that is vulnerable.

“At some point, there may be so much Treasury debt,
that investors may start wondering if they are overloaded in dollar assets,”
Mr. Blinder said.

[10]
While the focus in Washington has been on
putting together a stimulus package that will attract broader political support
when it comes up for a vote in the Senate,
here in Davos the talk has been about
the coming avalanche of Treasury debt needed to pay for the plan
on top of the bailout measures approved last fall,
like the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program or TARP.

[11]
The stimulus was approved Wednesday by the House without Republican support,
and could grow larger — mostly likely with additional tax cuts —
to attract a bipartisan coalition.

[12]
American officials maintain they are aware of the challenge.
A top White House adviser, Valerie Jarrett, promised in Davos on Thursday that
once the stimulus plan achieved its intended affect,
the United States would
“restore fiscal responsibility and return to a sustainable economic path.”

[She most likely is sincere, but even so one may question her predictive ability.
She presumes two things:
that the stimulus package will achieve its intended effect, and
that then the political system will show the self-discipline
that it has so sorely hitherto lacked.
A cynic would suggest filing that along with “the check is in the mail.”
By the way,
when was the last time the U.S. was on a “sustainable economic path”?
You can vote for what you think killed that;
I would vote for
  1. the fiscally toxic combination of
    the Medicare/Medicaid welfare programs established in the 1960s with
    the unbounded ability of the medical profession
    to keep finding new ways to spend unbounded sums on health care,
    and

  2. globalization.
]


[13]
Ms. Jarrett, a confidante of both President Obama and his wife, Michelle,
is the highest-ranking administration official at Davos.

[14]
To be sure, Congress and the White House
will ultimately need to refill the government’s coffers,
but how they might do that
is barely on the radar screen in Washington at this point.

[15]
“Even before Obama walked through the White House door,
there were plans for $1 trillion of new debt,”
said Niall Ferguson,
a Harvard historian who has studied borrowing and its impact on national power.
He now estimates that some $2.2 trillion in new government debt
will be issued this year,
assuming the stimulus plan is approved.

[16]
“You either crowd out other borrowers or you print money,”
Mr. Ferguson added.
“There is no way you can have $2.2 trillion in borrowing
without influencing interest rates or inflation in the long-term.”

[17]
Mr. Ferguson was particularly struck by the new borrowing because
the roots of the current crisis lay in an excess of American debt
at all levels,

from individual homeowners with subprime mortgages
to Wall Street banks who let their balance sheets balloon.

[18]
“This is a crisis of excessive debt,
which reached 355 percent of American gross domestic product,”
he said.
“It cannot be solved with more debt.”

[19]
While Mr. Ferguson is a skeptic of
the Keynesian thinking behind President Obama’s plan —
rather than borrowing and spending to stimulate the economy,
he favors corporate tax cuts —
even supporters of the plan like Mr. Zedillo and Stephen Roach of Morgan Stanley
have called on the White House to quickly address
how it will pay for the spending in the long-term.

[20]
“It’s huge,” the chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia, Mr. Roach, said.
“President Obama has now laid out a scenario of
multiyear, trillion-dollar deficits.”

[21]
To make matters worse, he said,
the United States “is a savings-short, deficit economy.
When we decide to borrow,
we’re asking lenders from around the world to step up and give us the money.”

[22]
The stimulus is widely expected to pass, but once it does, Mr. Roach said
the focus would shift to
“who foots the bill and what is the exit strategy.
We don’t have the answer to either question.”

[23]
Mr. Zedillo, who remembers how Mexico was forced to tighten its belt
when it received billions from Washington
to keep its economy from collapsing in 1994,
was even more blunt.

[24]
“People are not stupid,” Mr. Zedillo said.
“They see the huge deficit, the huge spending, and wonder what comes next.”





2009-11-23-NYT-Wave-of-Debt-Payments-Facing-US-Government
Wave of Debt Payments Facing U.S. Government
By EDMUND L. ANDREWS
New York Times, 2009-11-23

Labels: , ,

The trade deficit

FOREIGN TRADE (Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce)
is the official source for U.S. export and import statistics...
If you're searching for import or export statistics...
this is the place to get the information you need.

At that web site, the most interesting information to me (for 2012) is
1307 - U.S. Exports, Imports, and Merchandise Trade Balance by Country
[for years 2001 - 2010]
[Excel spreadsheet 222k] | [PDF table 165k]
found at the page Exports and Imports - The 2012 Statistical Abstract.
The (non-seasonally adjusted) figures for 2011 are at
PDF, XLS.











Here is an excerpt from Day of Reckoning (2007) by Patrick J. Buchanan.
Emphasis is added.



[7.1.25]
Between January 2002 and January 2007,
the gargantuan U.S. trade deficit set five straight world records,

as did the U.S. trade deficit in autos, auto parts, and trucks.
If this is the fruit of a successful trade policy,
what would a failed trade policy look like?

[7.1.26]
From 2001 to 2007,
America ran $4 trillion in trade deficits,
$2.6 trillion in manufactured goods.
[I.e., two-thirds of the trade deficit in those years.]
Three million manufacturing jobs, one in every six, vanished.
By January 2007, wages in manufacturing had fallen 3 percent in three years—
during a recovery when the stock market had risen every year.

[7.1.27]
Since NAFTA passed in 1993,
America has run fourteen straight trade deficits with Mexico.
Grand total: over $500 billion.
In 2006,
Mexico exported more than 900,000 vehicles to the United States.
The United States exported fewer than 600,000 to the entire world.

...

[7.1.29]
In 1943–44, at the height of World War II,
40 percent of all U.S. jobs were in manufacturing.
In 1950, a third of our labor force was still in manufacturing.
Today it is 10 percent and falling.
For the first seventy years of the twentieth century,
we ran trade surpluses every year.
We have now run trade deficits for thirty-five years.
We used to export twice as much as we imported.
Now we import twice as much as we export.
Is it good for America that our dependence on imports
has risen from 4 percent of GDP to 16 percent?
Is it good for America that we import a third of our manufactured goods?
Is it good that American workingmen and women
make fewer and fewer of the things their countrymen need,
while corporate chiefs bank billions of dollars
for shipping American jobs overseas?










Here is an excerpt from
“Decline is a Choice:
The New Liberalism and the end of American ascendancy
,” (2009-10-19)
by Charles Krauthammer.
Emphasis is added.



[R]esistance to decline begins with moral self-confidence and will.
But maintaining dominance is a matter not just of will but of wallet.
We are not inherently in economic decline.
We have
the most dynamic, innovative, technologically advanced economy in the world.
We enjoy the highest productivity.
It is true that

in the natural and often painful global division of labor
wrought by globalization,
less skilled endeavors like factory work migrate abroad,
but
America more than compensates
by pioneering the newer technologies and industries
of the information age.



There are, of course, major threats to the American economy.
But there is nothing inevitable and inexorable about them.
Take, for example,
the threat to the dollar (as the world’s reserve currency)
that comes from our massive trade deficits.
Here again,
the China threat is vastly exaggerated.
In fact,
fully two-thirds of our trade imbalance comes from imported oil. [Cf.]
This is not a fixed fact of life. We have a choice.
We have it in our power, for example,
to reverse the absurd de facto 30-year ban on new nuclear power plants.
We have it in our power
to release huge domestic petroleum reserves
by dropping the ban on offshore and Arctic drilling.
We have it in our power
to institute a serious gasoline tax
(refunded immediately through a payroll tax reduction)
to curb consumption and induce conservation.

[All three of Krauthammer’s suggested policy changes
would only reduce America’s dependence on foreign oil
(a valuable objective, to be sure).
They would do nothing
to reduce China’s overwhelming trade surplus vis-à-vis the U.S,
and the fast-rising mountain of debt that entails for the U.S.]


Nothing is written. Nothing is predetermined.
We can reverse the slide, we can undo dependence if we will it.




















Miscellaneous Articles


2010


2010-01-06-NYT-Asian-electronics-manufacturing
Asian Computer Makers Move Into Riskier Ventures
By ASHLEE VANCE
New York Times, 2010-01-06

[A single paragraph from the article; emphasis is added.]

As
manufacturing of electronics in the United States
began moving offshore decades ago,

some feared the American economy would suffer.
But the American companies,
as well as economists and policy makers,
said that
as long as
the high-value jobs like research and design
remained in the United States,
there was little danger.


[Yes, we’ve been hearing that fairly monotonously from the “elite.”
But “little danger” of what?
The incomes and life-styles of the “elite” being challenged?

Let’s look at what that off-shoring of jobs means to the rest of us.
It damages us in two ways: jobs and
the buildup of debt owed by the U.S.
to those countries that have a trade surplus with us.

The lack of jobs is an immediate issue of high salience now, in 2010,
and has been since the recession started around the start of 2009.

The buildup of debt is practically ignored by the chattering classes now,
since interest rates are low
and foreigners are still willing to recycle their dollars
by buying those U.S. treasuries and thus financing the U.S. federal deficit.
But anyone with an ounce of sense knows that
that situation is too good (for the U.S.) to last.
The time will come when all that debt to foreigners in general,
and the countries that contain those electronic manufacturers in particular,
will have to be paid back,
or the U.S. will face other very unpalatable alternatives.
So far as I know,
no country in history has maintained a monotonically increasing debt
without something awful happening to it.

So why is the “elite” so accepting of the loss of those manufacturing jobs?

One answer is that there are some in the “elite” who feel
those jobs were “low-value”
(see the above quote, and a quote above from Charles Krauthammer)
and thus not to be worried over.
But low-value to whom?]




2010-02-21-NYT-Wong-China
Rift Grows as U.S. and China Seek Differing Goals
By EDWARD WONG
New York Times News Analysis, 2010-02-21

...

[T]ensions are likely to worsen in coming months
as domestic pressures in each country
push the governments to assert their agendas more boldly,
and as China’s confidence in its economic system continues to grow.

On the American side,
a struggling economy is forcing the Obama administration to make
currency valuation and market liberalization top priorities.
With an unemployment rate of nearly 10 percent
and midterm elections coming up,
American officials are aware that
pushing China to raise the value of its currency, the renminbi,
and allowing American companies greater access to some Chinese markets
could be important political victories for Mr. Obama and his party.

“We’ve got to look at the risk of a more populist American public
and the U.S. Congress deciding that
China is the reason our economy isn’t growing enough,”
the American official said.

...

[This is certainly true, as far as it goes.
But where is concern about the effect of the trade deficit
on the rise of American debt to China?
There is no mention of that issue in the article.
So far as this article is concerned
that is not an issue for the American “elite.”
But if you stop to think about it,
how can that ever-rising debt to a foreign power,
and in fact our chief competitor,
not be a major vulnerability in what’s left of America’s future?
Cf. Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.]



























2012

2012-09-10-WP-Mexicans-snap-up-Made-in-USA
Middle-class Mexicans snap up more products ‘Made in USA’
Burgeoning middle class drives a roaring trade across the border
By Nick Miroff and William Booth
Washington Post, 2012-09-10

...

[The italicized line above was the subtitle in the print edition.]

[16]
Trade with the United States has increased sixfold
since the North American Free Trade Agreement went into effect in 1994,
according to Bank of Mexico and U.S. Commerce Department data.
The trade agreement eliminated tariffs for goods
and made it easier to invest across the border.

[17]
In the United States,
NAFTA is still often used as a pejorative shorthand for outsourced jobs,
particularly in Rust Belt states
where manufacturers have closed plants and moved south.
The torrid expansion of auto manufacturing in Mexico, for instance,
is viewed by some industry experts as a long-term threat
to much-touted U.S. job growth in the sector.

[18]
But NAFTA today generates far less controversy in Mexico.
The last large protests,
by farmers angry about cheap corn imports from Canada and the United States,
occurred in 2008.

[19]
During Mexico’s presidential campaign this year, none of the candidates —
not even leftist challenger Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador —
campaigned against NAFTA or threatened to revoke it.
The winner, President-elect Enrique Peña Nieto, said he wants to expand it.

[20]
And there is little wonder why.
Mexican exports to the United States
have soared from $42 billion in 1993 to $263 billion in 2011,

according to the Commerce Department.
Almost 80 percent of Mexico’s exports go to the U.S. market, led by
crude oil, fruits, vegetables, televisions, cellphones, computers
and passenger vehicles.

[21]
“Before NAFTA, we had a slight trade deficit with the United States,”
said Daniel Chiquiar, a Bank of Mexico statistician.
“Now we have a huge trade surplus.”

[22]
U.S. exports have also multiplied,
especially as the consumption tastes of the growing Mexican middle class
increasingly resemble those of U.S. shoppers.


[23]
“Mexico and the United States are no longer competitors,
where one country wins and the other loses.
They are partners,”
said Christopher Wilson of the Mexico Institute in Washington,
who is the author of the report “Working Together.”
“The Mexican and U.S. economies are now as deeply integrated as any on Earth.”

‘Looking for quality’

[24]
In a Costco store in the suburbs at the edge of Mexico City,
shoppers browse shelves loaded with pallets of Kirkland vitamins, value packs of Nature Valley granola bars and sacks of Cape Cod kettle-cooked potato chips.

[25]
From 2009 to 2011,
825 new discounters and more than 3,000 convenience stores
opened for business in Mexico.
The biggest growth came in modern retail chains, filled with U.S. products,
that are challenging, for better or worse,
the traditional mom-and-pop stores doling out soda, eggs and tortillas.

[26]
Mexico bought $198 billion worth of U.S. goods last year,
up from $41 billion in 1993.


[27]
The United States sold more stuff to Mexico
than to Brazil, India, Japan and Britain combined.

[28]
At Costco, even the walls in the butcher aisle
boast the “USDA Premium” and “USDA Choice” labels, in English.

...

[36]
About 6 million jobs in the United States depend on trade with Mexico,
according to the consulting group Trade Partnership Worldwide,
which calculated the total for the Mexican government in 2008.

[But nowhere in the article do the authors tell us the converse number,
how many jobs jobs in Mexico depend on trade with the United States,
which would give insight into how many jobs (net) the U.S. has lost.
It seems to me the lack of giving that balancing number makes the article one-sided
on the question of the effect of NAFTA on U.S. employment.]


...

[While the article emphasizes
the (increase in the) amount of goods that the U.S. sells to Mexico,
it almost totally ignores the crucial fact that
the U.S. now runs a large net trade deficit with Mexico.
The only mention I could find of that crucial fact was in ¶21,
where it is given from the Mexican point of view,
where it is a “huge” surplus.
I guess the authors didn’t want to point out that
a “huge trade surplus” for Mexico is a “huge trade deficit” for the U.S.

Below is a table which pulls together the trade figures given in the article,
in ¶20 and 26,
to show the actual deficit in 1993 and 2011.]


Year M -> U.S. U.S. -> M U.S. Trade Deficit
1993 $42G $41G $1G
2011 $263G $198G $65G

[To me, those numbers suggest that
Ross Perot was absolutely right circa 1992
when he warned that
passage of NAFTA would lead to a “Giant Sucking Sound”
as American jobs went south to Mexico.

What does that $65G deficit mean in terms of jobs?
I am not an economist nor a student of this issue,
but can show how certain assumptions will lead to certain conclusions.
Suppose the Mexican workers making the goods implicit in that $65G deficit
are paid an average of $10K ($10,000) per year.
Then we would be talking $65G/($10K/worker) = 6.5M workers.
That is no doubt highly simplistic,
but might indicate the ball park of the job loss implicit in that trade deficit.]


...

[42]
This year,
Mexico became the No. 1 investment destination for the aerospace industry.









2016

2016-01-Autor-Dorn-Hanson-The-China-Shock
"The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade"
by David H. Autor, David Dorn, Gordon H. Hanson
NBER (National Bureau of Economic Research), 2016-01

ABSTRACT:
China’s emergence as a great economic power has induced an epochal shift in patterns of world trade.
Simultaneously, it has challenged much of the received empirical wisdom about how labor markets adjust to trade shocks.
Alongside the heralded consumer benefits of expanded trade are substantial adjustment costs and distributional consequences.
These impacts are most visible in the local labor markets in which the industries exposed to foreign competition are concentrated.
Adjustment in local labor markets is remarkably slow,
with wages and labor-force participation rates remaining depressed and unemployment rates remaining elevated
for at least a full decade after the China trade shock commences.
Exposed workers experience greater job churning and reduced lifetime income.
At the national level, employment has fallen in U.S. industries more exposed to import competition, as expected, but offsetting employment gains in other industries have yet to materialize.
Better understanding when and where trade is costly, and how and why it may be beneficial, are key items on the research agenda for trade and labor economists.






2016-03-22-WP-how-republicans-helped-create-donald-trump-more-than-15-years-ago
What Republicans did 15 years ago to help create Donald Trump today
Republicans rallied around a law to expand trade. Now it may doom them.
by Jim Tankersley
Washington Post, 2016-03-22

The Republican establishment began losing its party to Donald Trump on May 24, 2000, at 5:41 p.m., on the floor of the House of Representatives.

Urged on by their presidential standard-bearer, Texas Gov. George W. Bush, and by nearly all of the business lobbyists who represented the core of the party’s donor class, three-quarters of House Republicans voted to extend the status of permanent normal trade relations to China. They were more than enough, when added to a minority of Democrats, to secure passage of a bill that would sail through the Senate and be signed into law by President Bill Clinton.

The legislation, a top Republican priority, held the promise of greater economic prosperity for Americans. But few could predict that it would cause a series of economic and political earthquakes that has helped put the GOP in the difficult spot it is in today: with the most anti-trade Republican candidate in modern history, Trump, moving closer to clinching the party’s nomination.

...

In many ways, the vote worked out much better for the GOP’s donor class
than for the working-class voters now flocking to Trump.
[Surprise!]
By 2004, U.S. imports from China had nearly doubled.
By 2011, the U.S. trade deficit with China had quadrupled.
Thanks to the law, Americans were able to buy cheaper electronics, clothes, toys and other consumer goods.

Some companies ramped up exports to China, creating jobs.
Other companies were able to send millions of jobs
to a country where factory workers earned far less than those in the United States.

The ripple effects of those job losses have persisted, for workers,
in ways that surprised many economists.
Standard economists predicted no net job losses from expanded trade with China,
economists David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson wrote
in a working paper released this year
["The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade"].
In reality, the authors found, new jobs have not materialized quickly,
as expected, to replace the jobs lost from trade.

“Adjustment in local labor markets is remarkably slow,
with wages and labor-force participation rates remaining depressed
and unemployment rates remaining elevated for at least a full decade
after the China trade shock commences,” they wrote.
“Exposed workers experience greater job churning and reduced lifetime income.”

...




2016-03-22-Prestowitz-Boston-Globe-oped-trading-up-and-down
Trading up or down
by Clyde Prestowitz
Boston Globe Op-ed, 2016-03-22

...

While economists argue endlessly over the impact of the trade deficit,
one incontrovertible conclusion stands out.
None of the trade agreements have eliminated it, or even reduced it, as promised,
and none of them have come close to achieving other promised benefits.

Take the 2000-01 deal to include China as a member of the World Trade Organization.
At the time, the US trade deficit with China was about $80 billion.
The US trade representative and the secretary of commerce
told Congress and the public that
getting China into the WTO would dramatically reduce that deficit
because China had more and higher barriers to US exports
than the United States had to Chinese exports.
Ergo, in the wake of a deal,
US exports to China would soar far faster than Chinese exports to America.
Well, 15 years later the US deficit with China is almost $370 billion.


Or, consider the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement of 2012.
In 2011, the US trade deficit with Korea was $13 billion.
Top US trade officials again told Congress and the public that
this deal would dramatically open the Korean market to US exports
and sharply cut the bilateral trade deficit.
But by 2015, the deficit had climbed to $28 billion
as Korean exports to America exploded,
while US exports to Korea remained about the same.
The growth in this deficit,
contrary to the forecasts of the government
and most of the leading economic think tanks,
represents the elimination of about 90,000 US jobs,
if we apply the Commerce Department’s calculation of
6,000 jobs for every billion dollars of exports or imports.

...

But, if the deals are so bad,
why have intelligent, well-educated officials of both the Republican and Democratic parties
persisted in making them,
and in making the same old discredited cases for them?

There are two major reasons.
The first is that
the primary purpose of the trade agreements
is not to improve the economic welfare of the United States.
Rather, it is to strengthen the American geopolitical position.

For instance, I was one of several people invited to the White House in 2009
to discuss the possibility of a Trans Pacific Partnership free trade agreement.
When I asked what the purpose of the agreement was,
I heard that it was to show our Southeast Asian friends and allies
that America is back, and
that it really cares about the region.
In other words, this deal was not primarily aimed at
creating American jobs or raising American incomes.
It was aimed at reassuring allies and friends
and at countering China’s influence

The second reason is that universities, think tanks, and media
still propagate a badly outdated notion of trade and globalization.
It is argued that trade is always and everywhere a win-win proposition
and that even if a trading partner doesn’t reciprocate with open markets,
unilateral free trade is still better than mutually closed markets.
The problem is that these assumptions include
full employment, fixed exchange rates,
no cross-border investment or technology flows,
and no costs for moving or closing one industry and opening a new one.

This clearly isn’t the world in which we live.
Just think about exchange rates.
They have been floating since the early 1970s.
Countries like China and Switzerland, to name just two,
have systematically intervened in global currency markets to devalue their currencies.
So, in a trade deal, maybe every country agrees to cut its tariffs by, say, 10 percent.
But then perhaps one of the countries acts to devalue its currency by 20 or 30 percent,
negating the effect of the tariff cuts. Or think of investment.
In today’s world, global financial flows are greater than trade flows.
As for technology, countries like Japan, in the past, and China, today,
have often made technology-transfer a condition of market access.








2016-05-29-Prestowitz-when-it-comes-to-trade-trump-is-spot-on
When it comes to trade, Trump is spot-on
by Clyde Prestowitz
Tribune News Service, Memphis Commercial-Appeal, 2016-05-29

For all his bullying, narcissism and self-contradiction,
there is one point on which
presumptive Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump cannot be criticized.
In attacking our longtime free-trade policies and deals,
he has brought necessary attention to a huge elephant in America's policy room,
one that has run wild and must be stopped by the nation's next leader.

...

What did Trump so presciently see?

First, he saw the problematic approach taken by establishmentarians like Robert Zoelleck, a former World Bank president and deputy secretary of state, who in a Wall Street Journal op-ed this month argued for the TPP by focusing on the impact America's trade deals have had on national security.

To insiders like Zoelleck, the main purpose of trade and globalization policy is not to enhance the welfare of ordinary Americans; it's to shore up allies against Russia and stop China from doing what is never precisely stated.

This position is held by the very people who were silent when General Electric, rather than invest here, decided to move its high-tech aviation electronics division to Shanghai through a joint venture with a state-owned Chinese company. These are the people who promoted and profited from the offshoring of millions of U.S. manufacturing jobs in the name of making China a responsible stakeholder in the world economic system.

Neoclassical economists and the foreign policy establishment see the nonreciprocal opening of U.S. markets as an allegedly cost-free way of buying friends and persuading countries with tiny economies to host U.S. troops and join us in supporting supposedly critical issues at the United Nations.

This approach has long been deemed cost-free because top Anglo-American economists — not, mind you, Japanese, Korean, German or Singaporean economists — argued that free trade is always win-win.

So, opening U.S. markets to foreign competition, even when it has been clear the competitors are operating under mercantilist, export-led growth policies, has been said to be a big win for the vast majority of Americans. Of course, it has been admitted, a few workers or companies will be displaced, but it's also been promised they'll be compensated by the vast majority of winners.

All this has been based on the counterintuitive concept of comparative advantage, first articulated in 1817 by British economist David Ricardo. The theory basically holds that countries should concentrate on producing what they do best and trade for the rest.

What countries produce best, according the theory, is determined by their endowments of land, labor and capital. Therefore, countries like America, with skilled labor and lots of land and capital, ought to produce agricultural and advanced manufactured products and trade those for toys, clothing, and other products from countries with lots of cheap labor.

However, as economist Paul Krugman noted in the early 1980s, this theory rested on a host of far-fetched assumptions: fixed exchange rates, no cross-border flows of investment or technology, constant full employment, no cost of entry into or out of business, no government intervention such as Social Security or minimum wages, no unions and, very important, no economies of scale.

Indeed, in the late 1990s, Ralph Gomory, a former chief scientist at IBM, and William Baumol, a former president of the American Economic Association, showed that in the real world, where many countries and products were experiencing rapid technological change, immense cross-border flows of investment and technology, and frequent fluctuations in economic growth and employment, trade is as likely to be a zero-sum (I win, you lose) proposition as a win-win situation.

Trump probably hasn't read these analyses. But he has seen that none of the forecasts by Republican or Democratic administrations for job creation and reduced trade deficits came true. For instance, our $2 billion trade surplus with Mexico has become a $50 billion deficit since the North American Free Trade Agreement took effect. Our trade deficit with China, $80 billion in 2011, has ballooned to nearly $400 billion. Our free-trade pact with South Korea has seen U.S. exports decline, imports double and 11,000 jobs lost.

It's hard to deny that Trump has been right on trade.

Labels: ,

International trade

2007


2007-03-18-FT-China-commercial-aircraft-Boeing-Airbus
China to challenge Boeing and Airbus
By Richard McGregor in Beijing, Kevin Done in London
and Doug Cameron in Chicago
Financial Times, 2007-03-18
(This article is summarized, and linked to, at chinadigitaltimes.net.)

[Emphasis is added.]

[1]
China plans to mount a head-on challenge
to the dominance of Boeing and Airbus
in the global market for big passenger jets
by setting up a state-owned company to build the aircraft.
[The Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (CACC).]

[2]
A statement on the government’s website issued late on Sunday said
the state council – the cabinet –
had taken an “important strategic decision”
to begin research and development to enter the market.

[3]
China is one of the biggest target markets globally for both Boeing and Airbus.
The European group’s latest forecast
places China in second place behind only the US
by both the number and value of jets needed between 2006 and 2025
with a market for 2,929 large aircraft worth $349bn.

[4]
The move, backed by technical know-how developed over
the industry’s 50-year history in the country,
reflected “the wish of the entire Chinese people for many years”,
said the statement.

[5]
It gave no details about the company or how it would be funded,
nor did it set out any timetable.
The decision was taken on February 26,
but there was no explanation for the delay in the announcement.

[6]
Boeing of the US and Europe’s Airbus have a duopoly in
the market for big jets of 100 seats or more.
Both manufacturers estimate the market
to be worth about $2,600bn over the next 20 years
with forecast deliveries of about 23,000 new jets
excluding regional jets of below 100 seats.

[7]
It would take decades for China
to develop a full range of big jets to compete fully with Airbus and Boeing,
but the US and European aerospace industries
take the long-term challenge seriously,
not least as the country will be able to draw on
the support of potentially huge demand from domestic carriers.
It has taken Airbus nearly 40 years to develop a complete family of large jets.

[8]
Steven Udvar-Hazy,
chairman and chief executive of International Lease Finance Corporation,
one of the world’s top two aircraft leasing companies
and one of the most influential purchasers of new aircraft,
said last week that
both China and Russia could develop
aircraft capable of competing with
the Boeing 737 and Airbus A320 families of single aisle jets
within 15 years
with government backing and technology gained from both companies.

[9]
He said
there was no reason why companies other than Boeing and Airbus
could not enter the business.


[10]
China has never hidden its ambition
to become a major force in the aviation and aerospace industries,
requiring foreign companies, which sell into its increasingly lucrative market,
also to manufacture parts there and transfer technology.

[11]
It is due to begin deliveries of its first home-made regional jet, the ARJ21,
in 2009,
and is also adding other joint ventures with foreign companies
to assemble aircraft in the country.

[12]
Airbus signed a framework agreement with the Chinese authorities last October
to build its first aircraft assembly plant outside Europe
at Tianjin in eastern China.












2009


2009-09-15-Buchanan
Globalism vs. Americanism
by Patrick J. Buchanan
The American Conservative, 2009-09-15

Down at the Chinese outlet store in Albany known as Wal-Mart,
Chinese tires have so successfully undercut U.S.-made tires
that the Cooper Tire factory in that south Georgia town had to shut down.

Twenty-one hundred Georgians lost their jobs.

The tale of Cooper Tire and what it portends
is told in last week’s Washington Post by Peter Whoriskey.

How could tires made on the other side of the world, then shipped to Albany,
be sold for less than tires made in Albany?

Here’s how.

At Cooper Tire, the wages were $18 to $21 per hour.
In China, they are a fraction of that.
The Albany factory is subject to
U.S. health-and-safety, wage-and-hour and civil rights laws
from which Chinese plants are exempt.
Environmental standards had to be met at Cooper Tire
or the plant would have been closed.
Chinese factories are notorious polluters.

China won the competition because
the 14th Amendment’s “equal protection of the laws”
does not apply to the People’s Republic.
While free trade laws grant China free and equal access to the U.S. market,
China can pay workers wages and force them to work hours
that would violate U.S. law,
and China can operate plants
whose health, safety and environmental standards
would have their U.S. competitors shut down as public nuisances.

Beijing also manipulates its currency to keep export prices low
and grants a rebate on its value-added tax on exports to the U.S.A.,
while imposing a value-added tax on goods coming from the U.S.A.

Thus did China, from 2004 to 2008,
triple her share of the U.S. tire market from 5 percent to 17 percent
and take down Cooper Tire of Albany.

But not to worry.
Cooper Tire has seen the light and is now opening and acquiring plants in China,
and sending Albany workers over to train the Chinese who took their jobs.

Welcome to 21st century America, where

globalism has replaced patriotism
as the civil religion of our corporate elites.

As Thomas Jefferson reminded us, “Merchants have no country.”

What has this meant to the republic that was once
the most self-sufficient and independent in all of history?

Since 2001, when George Bush took the oath,
the United States has run
$3.8 trillion in trade deficits in manufactured goods,
more than twice the
$1.68 trillion in trade deficits we ran for imported oil and gas.

Our trade deficit with China in manufactured goods alone,
$1.58 trillion over those eight years,
roughly equals the entire U.S. trade deficit for oil and gas.

U.S. politicians [and pundits] never cease to wail of
the need for “energy independence.”
But why is our dependence on
the oil of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, Nigeria, Canada, Mexico and Venezuela
a greater concern than
our dependence on
a non-democratic rival great power
for computers and vital components of
our weapons systems and high-tech industries?

As Executive Director Auggie Tantillo
of the American Manufacturing Trade Action Committee
compellingly argues:

“Running a trade deficit
for natural resources that the United States lacks
is something that cannot be helped,
but running a massive deficit in manmade products
that America easily could produce itself is a choice —
a poor choice that is bankrupting the country
and responsible for the loss of millions of jobs.”


How many millions of jobs?

In the George W. Bush [43] years,
we lost 5.3 million manufacturing jobs,
one-fourth to one-third of all we had in 2001.

And our dependence on China is growing.

Where Beijing was responsible for
60 percent of the U.S. trade deficit in manufactured goods in 2008,
in the first six months of 2009,
China accounted for 79 percent of our trade deficit in manufactured goods.

How can we end this dependency
and begin building factories and creating jobs here,
rather than deepening our dependency on
a China that seeks to take our place in the sun?

The same way Alexander Hamilton did,
when we Americans produced almost nothing
and were even more dependent on Great Britain than we are on China today.

Let us do unto our trading partners as they have done unto us.

As they rebate value-added taxes on exports to us,
and impose a value-added tax on our exports to them,
let us reciprocate.
Impose a border tax equal to a VAT
on all their goods entering the United States,
and use the hundreds of billions to cut corporate taxes
on all manufacturing done here in the United States.

Where they have tilted the playing field against us,
let us tilt it back again.
Transnational companies are as amoral as sharks.
What is needed is simply to
cut their profits from moving factories and jobs abroad and
increase their profits for bringing them back to the U.S.A.

It’s not rocket science.
Hamilton, James Madison [4] and Abraham Lincoln [16] all did it.
Obama’s tariffs on Chinese tires are a good start.



[I am anything but an expert on the subject of international trade and taxation.
But I do know that
the United States used to run a sizable surplus in trade,
and that
for the United States to continue running deficits as it has in the recent past
will lead to a terrible future (note especially 2009-03-29-Lachman ff.),
one that will make future generations despise the current generation
for its short-sighted, self-serving, greedy policy choices.
Something needs to be done, now, to start reversing those deficits.

Whether Buchanan’s recommendation is the optimal choice, I do not know.
But something needs to be done.
I have no doubt whatsoever that reducing or reversing those deficits
will cause some domestic constituencies pain.
But we really must stop living so much for the present,
and we must reconsider the whole set of priorities
that have led to the present disastrous trade deficits.

(And I firmly believe that part of the policy change that is necessary
is not to increase spending on health care,
but to decrease it severely.
There is no way the U.S. can spend
the exorbitant amounts it currently does on health care
and be competitive internationally.
That is something that those pushing for more health care spending
seem to totally fail to acknowledge,
or possibly even be aware of or care about.)]




2009-10-20-NYT-Bernanke
Fed Chief Cites Role of Trade Imbalances in Crisis
By EDMUND L. ANDREWS
New York Times, 2009-10-20
[This is actually from the 10-19 draft;
note that the published title is the rather less pointed
“Asia Said to Be Leading the Globe Out of Crisis”;
the lead paragraph, at least, of the text also seems less pointed.
It looks like one or more editors
is trying to avoid giving the American public the full negative story.]


SANTA BARBARA, Calif. —

[1]
Ben S. Bernanke, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, said on Monday that
global trade imbalances played a central role in the global economic crisis
and warned that both the United States and fast-growing Asian nations
needed to do more to prevent them from recurring.

[2]
“We were smug,” Mr. Bernanke said of the United States
in a question and answer session following his speech.

[3]
In answer to another question, he said
the American financial regulatory system was “inadequate”
at managing the immense inflows of cheap money
from China and other countries that had huge trade surpluses.

[4]
In his prepared remarks, Mr. Bernanke acknowledged that
trade imbalances had declined sharply as a result of the crisis,
mainly because trade itself plunged,
but he warned that
American foreign indebtedness would aggravate the imbalances once again
unless the United States reduced its soaring federal budget deficit.


[5]
“The United States must increase its national saving rate,” he said.
“The most effective way to accomplish this goal
is by establishing a sustainable fiscal trajectory,
anchored by
a clear commitment to substantially reduce federal deficits over time.”

[6]
The federal deficit for the 2009 fiscal year soared to $1.4 trillion,
almost triple the deficit in 2008,
and budget analysts predict that
budget deficits will average almost $1 trillion a year over the next decade.

[7]
By the same token, he said,
Asian countries needed to rely less on exports
and more on their consumption at home for their economic growth.
One way to increase Asian household consumption, he said,
would be for countries like China to increase social insurance programs
and reduce the uncertainty that currently hangs over many consumers.

...















2010


2010-09-30-NYT-House-passes-tariff-on-imports-from-China
House Passes Bill to Impose Tariffs on Chinese Goods
By DAVID E. SANGER and SEWELL CHAN
New York Times, 2010-09-30

[This is a grab from the web edition on 2010-09-29.]

WASHINGTON — The House of Representatives sent a unusually confrontational signal to the Chinese leadership on Wednesday, voting overwhelmingly to give President Obama the authority to impose tariffs on all Chinese imports — more than $300 billion this year — in retaliation for Beijing’s refusal to revalue its currency.

The vote was 348 to 79.

The bill is unlikely to become law because
the prospects for Senate approval are dim.


Nonetheless, the action was intended to hand President Obama additional leverage in what has become a major flashpoint between the world’s two largest economies. While tariffs have been slapped on specific products, from steel to tires, because of evidence of unfair export subsidies, the threat to put sizable tariffs on a country’s entire line exports to the United States is highly unusual — and, some argue, of dubious legality under international trade law. It reflects both election-year politics over jobs and huge frustration over unfulfilled promises by China to allow its currency to rise in value, which would make Chinese goods less competitive in the United States.

The administration has been of two minds about the legislation. It has often used the rising public anger over China’s trade advantage to argue to Chinese leaders that the United States would no longer tolerate deliberate currency manipulation. That was a point Mr. Obama made repeatedly last week in a two-hour-long meeting with Wen Jiabao, China’s prime minister.

But in conversations with Congress, Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner and other officials have warned of the danger of touching off a trade war, in which China blocks American goods in retaliation — a tit-for-tat feud that could hurt both economies.

[The U.S. imports over $300G from China,
while it exports well under $100G.
The Chinese are the ones who benefit monetarily from the current arrangement.]


The risks go beyond trade.
President Obama is pressing China for help on
cutting exports to Iran,
managing a dangerous leadership transition in North Korea and
coming to some kind of accord on curbing carbon outputs
that contribute to global warming.
He is also coming up with what one senior administration official called
“new rules of the road” over disputed maritime territory.

But in Beijing, and on Capitol Hill, all that has pales in comparison to the currency dispute, which is often portrayed in the Chinese press as an effort to curb China’s growth, and thus its power.
























2016

2016-04-30-Fingleton-trump-has-a-sound-trade-policy-but-where-will-he-get-sound-trade-policy-aides
Trump Has A Sound Trade Policy,
But Where Will He Get Sound Trade Policy Aides?

by Eamonn Fingleton
The Unz Review, 2016-04-30

...

Here are a few other well-informed and reliable trade experts whom Trump should seek out at the first opportunity:

Dan DiMicco. In his former capacity as chief executive of the Nucor steel company, DiMicco fought many trade battles and is an expert on East Asian dumping.

Ralph Gomory. A noted applied mathematician and former head of research at IBM, he is the author, with William Baumol, of Global Trade and Conflicting National Interests. In this book and follow-up papers, Gomory has challenged the theoretical foundations of textbook free trade theory.

Kevin Kearns. Head of the U.S. Business and Industry Council, an organization representing domestic manufacturers, Kearns formerly served as a foreign service officer in Germany, Korea, and Japan, and in that capacity observed first-hand the obstacles faced by US companies in trying to export to key foreign markets. In Japan, he opposed the give-away of American taxpayer funded aerospace technology to the Japanese FSX program.

Robert Lighthizer. A partner in the Skadden Arps law firm and a former deputy United States Trade Representative (USTR), he divides his time between traditional trade litigation, policy advice, and legislative initiatives. He represents heavy manufacturing, agricultural and high-tech companies and has been lead counsel in countless antidumping and countervailing duty cases.

Richard McCormack. Publisher of Manufacturing & Technology News, a well-regarded newsletter, McCormack is an expert on the practical problems faced by U.S. industry in competing in rigged global markets.

Peter Morici. A professor of international business at the University of Maryland and a former advisor to the U.S. International Trade Commission, he is one of the few prominent academic economists who forthrightly challenges his colleagues’ ivory tower commitment to unilateral free trade.

Patrick A. Mulloy. A lawyer who served five two-year terms on the bipartisan United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, he currently serves as a consultant to non-profit groups interested in reforming U.S. trade and economic policies.

Michael Sekora. A noted physicist, he founded Project Socrates,
a classified U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency program
established in 1983 within the Reagan administration. He holds that
the cause of U.S. industrial decline is that
U.S. decision-makers abandoned technology-based planning
and adopted economic-based planning
at the end of World War II.


Alan Tonelson. As research fellow at the U.S. Business and Industry Council Educational Foundation, he has written extensively on free trade and globalization and their role in U.S. industrial decline.

...

Labels: , ,

Laissez-faire free trade

Here are some excerpts from the 2008 book
In the Jaws of the Dragon:
America’s Fate in the Coming Era of Chinese Dominance

by Eamonn Fingleton.
The emphasis is added.


















Chapter 2
“Don’t Worry, Be Happy”





Section 2.7
The Truth About Laissez-Faire


[2.7.1]
As we have noted, thanks to their faith in American economic dogma,
many American policymakers have been lulled into a false sense of security
about recent economic trends.
They have been assured that
America’s trade deficits will automatically prove self-correcting,
if only policymakers would leave everything to free markets.
Equally, they have been persuaded that
Beijing’s current highly interventionist economic strategy
will prove self-defeating.
Chastened Chinese leaders, it is argued,
will embrace laissez-faire quickly enough
once they discover the error of their ways.

[2.7.2]
The assurances about American trade deficits
can be disposed of in a few sentences.
The idea that the deficits will prove self-correcting
has been a standard shibboleth of Washington discourse since the 1970s.
While reasonable people
might have been persuaded to give this view the benefit of the doubt
thirty years ago,
they can hardly be expected to continue to do so today.

[2.7.3]
Of course, in recent years many defenders of the Washington view
have shifted ground to argue that
even if the deficits do not prove self-correcting,
we need not worry.
The deficits-don’t-matter view
has been prominently championed by Vice President Dick Cheney
as well as by many other influential neoconservative thinkers.
(In Ron Suskind’s The Price of Loyalty [2004],
former U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill
quotes Cheney saying at a cabinet meeting in 2002,
“Reagan proved deficits don’t matter.”)
Yet those who argue that deficits don’t matter
no longer have a leg to stand on.

The reality is that every dollar America spends in projecting power abroad—
indeed every dollar it spends on defense—
has to be borrowed abroad.
Not only that, much of the money comes from its main power rival, China.
To say the least, America’s attempts to pursue an independent foreign policy
will be subject increasingly to a veto in Beijing.
In any case, it is the sheerest of wishful thinking to imagine that
the United States can long remain a world power
if all it has to sell the world, besides wheat[, beef,] and oranges
is treasury bonds.


[2.7.4]
More generally, it should be noted that
laissez-faire has proved a disappointment
almost everywhere it has been tried.
The fact is that in the last four decades [1968–2008]
those advanced nations that have been most faithful to laissez-faire—
the United States and Britain—
have been notable for economic mediocrity, if not downright dysfunction.
Their currencies have on balance fallen precipitately,
their trade positions have spun out of control, and
they have lost the advanced manufacturing industries
that provide a bedrock of well-paid secure jobs
to support broad-based prosperity

[and prevent the trade deficit from spinning totally out of control].

[2.7.5]
The problems with Western economic dogma have long been particularly clear
in the automobile industry.
The nations that have believed in open markets
have largely lost their car industries:
the United States and Britain are the two obvious examples.

[2.7.6]
On the other hand
those nations that have most avidly protected their car markets
have seen their car industries boom.
The principal examples are Japan
which has boosted its world market share four-fold since 1970,
and South Korea which has achieved a phenomenal twenty-fold increase.
It is worth noting that, as of 2007,
South Korea was described by DaimlerChrysler as
“the most closed market in the industrialized world.”

[2.7.7]
All the empirical evidence suggests that
a laissez-faire approach to trade no longer works,
at least not for large nations like the United States and Britain,
not to mention Japan and South Korea.
(Full disclosure:
open markets have worked a lot better in leveling up
small, previously poor economies like Ireland and Finland—
but that is another matter.)

[2.7.8]
After decades of denying any problems,
American economic scholars are now finally beginning to ask
what is wrong with laissez-faire.
Thus, the Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Samuelson
has made some “heretical” public comments
questioning the standard case for free trade.
Meanwhile, in their book
Global Trade and Conflicting National Interests (2000),
Ralph Gomory and William Baumol have shown—
with the sort of rigorous mathematical models
that doctrinaire economists insist on—
that in certain circumstances
outsourcing can be a net negative.

[2.7.9]
Among other top economic thinkers who have recently publicly questioned the orthodoxy are
Alan Blinder, a Princeton professor and former vice-chairman of the Federal Reserve;
Lawrence Summers, the Harvard professor who served as Treasury Secretary in the Clinton [42] administration; and
the Berkeley-based Nobel Prize winner George Akerlof.



[2.7.10]
The basic problem is that
laissez-faire is an old dogma
born in the very different economic conditions of Europe two centuries ago.

Although the theory’s early enunciators, Adam Smith and David Ricardo,
stated their case as timelessly applicable,
and this is how it continues to be interpreted today
(at least in the English-speaking world),
they failed to anticipate the dramatic economic changes we have seen
in the last [half century].

[2.7.11]
A fundamental flaw in the Smith-Ricardo model is that it is static,
whereas the real world is dynamic.

The model concerns itself merely with the allocation of resources
at just one moment in time.
It considers the capital and labor available to society at that moment
and predicts that
these resources are likely to serve most efficiently in satisfying consumers’ needs
if all economic actors—investors, managers, workers, and consumers—
are allowed full freedom to maximize their individual positions.

[2.7.12]
While this theory was helpful in times gone by
(and it is still useful in analyzing countless narrowly focused economic problems today),
it has become more and more misleading as a guide to
the workings of today’s highly complex modern global economy.
A key point never considered by Smith and Ricardo is that,
as we have already pointed out [§1.6],
a nation like China can use authoritarian controls to achieve
a preternaturally high savings rate.
Suitably channeled into fast-growth industries,
the resulting capital can power a fast rate of growth in real wages.
Thus the promise to consumers is that
their involuntary early sacrifices will result in
a much more prosperous old age.
It is a promise that has been honored in one East Asian nation after another.

[2.7.13]
Part of the reason the strategy works is that poor nations start with
many easy opportunities for “technology catch-up.”
That is, by investing in standard production technologies
already widely used in richer countries,
they can generate massive increases in productivity.
[Anybody care to try that in an African nation, or in Haiti?]
...

[2.7.14]

Laissez-faire theory is crucially flawed
in a different sense in that
it makes no allowance for the possibility that
nations can manipulate technological progress
to benefit themselves at the expense of others.

Laissez-faire theory is based on the assumption that
breakthroughs in production technology, if they occur at all,
will accrue to all producers equally.
Although this assumption was broadly realistic two centuries ago
(when most of the know-how to compete at the leading edge
either was already in the public domain
or could readily be acquired by dint of
rudimentary industrial espionage),
it is completely mistaken today.

After all,
leading-edge corporations these days spend ever larger sums each year
to achieve proprietary improvements in their production technologies
and thus establish a decisive lead over their competitors.

[2.7.15]
For a nation like China
that wants to boost its technological position at the expense of its rivals,
the course is obvious:
  1. Extort technologies from rival nations.
    In this regard Beijing’s control of access to the Chinese market
    is a huge bargaining chip:
    foreign corporations are simply told that
    if they want a fair shot at the Chinese market
    they must transfer more and more technology to China.
    Key American corporations such as Intel, Microsoft, and General Motors
    have meekly complied.
    One of the more spectacular beneficiaries of this strategy has been
    China’s fast-rising aerospace industry.
    By adroit bargaining,
    Beijing has pressured both Boeing and Airbus
    to transfer key production technologies.
    [In that situation, pressure was clearly more significant than bargaining.]
    Thanks in large measure to such transfers,
    Beijing is planning to launch a full-size commercial airliner by 2020.

  2. Fund research and development.
    This strategy has played little part so far in China’s rise,
    but it will become increasingly important
    as Chinese industry becomes more technologically advanced.
    Here again Japan has set an important example.
    Thanks to considerable help from their national government,
    Japanese corporations spend nearly $100G a year
    on research and development.
    Most such research is devoted to improving production processes
    with the aim of
    making Japanese factories ever more competitive.

  3. Prevent Chinese industry’s key technologies
    from leaking abroad.

    For now Chinese industry does not have many technologies to guard,
    but this strategy will become increasingly relevant in future years.
    What is clear is that
    the governments of the more advanced nations of East Asia
    have long carefully guarded their key technologies from leaking abroad.
    Japan and South Korea have been the two prime examples.

[2.7.16]
As China climbs the technology ladder
the impact on other nations’ economies will become ever greater.
This is because at the leading edge of technological progress,
global competition is increasingly characterized by
a winner-take-all syndrome.
A nation that achieves a narrow competitive edge
in making, for example, a new type of advanced microchip
can at a stroke wipe out its competitors worldwide.
The rewards therefore will increasingly accrue to nations like China
that take a highly focused national approach to technological competition.

[2.7.17]
Part of the problem, argues the Washington-based trade expert Patrick Mulloy,
is that

the interests of American corporations
are increasingly at odds with
those of the American nation.

In a personal addendum to
the 2006 report of the United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Mulloy, who served as a top Commerce Department official
in the Clinton [42] administration, commented:
The interests of the U.S.-based multinational corporations,
which have done so much to influence our current policies toward China,
are often not aligned with the broader interests of our nation.
This is not because they have malevolent intent.
It is a systemic problem for which
we must develop a public policy response.
Those corporations, as they are charged to do in our economic system,
are focused on “shareholder value.”

They are not charged to consider the larger impact of their decisions
on the American economy and workers,
and the impetus they give to China’s growing
international, political, and military strength.

[Twas not always so, as Clyde Prestowitz points out
in chapter 7 of The Betrayal of American Prosperity,
where he notes that prior to the 1970s
the corporate value system was focused on all stakeholders,
not merely the shareholders.]



[2.7.18]
While we do not have space for a full discussion of
the problems with laissez-faire in modern conditions,
let’s simply note that economic planning chiefs in Beijing
do not necessarily “shoot themselves in the foot”
when they assume a strongly assertive role in steering China’s economic development.
While laissez-faire advocates are right in arguing that
government intervention has often proved counterproductive
in, for instance, Latin America,
the lesson of East Asia is that,
in the hands of intelligent, patriotic, and well-organized officials,
government intervention has proved on balance a strongly positive force.


As we will now see, few instances of market intervention
have been more rationally based than
the strongly pro-manufacturing bias of Chinese industrial policy.

Labels: , ,

"Poor little Japan"

2012-10-27-WP-Harlan-a-declining-japan-loses-its-once-hopeful-champions
A declining Japan loses its once-hopeful champions
By Chico Harlan
Washington Post, 2012-10-27

For a powerful and valid rebuttal to this highly biased article, see the next post,
“Is the Washington Post Racist?” by Eamonn Fingleton.

As to the trade balance between Japan and the United States,
note that this Commerce Department report shows that
in 2010 the balance was $60 billion against the United States.]


TOKYO —

[1]
Jesper Koll, an economist who’s lived in Japan for 26 years,
says it’s not easy for him to keep faith in a country
that’s shrinking, aging, stuck in protracted economic gloom
and losing fast ground to China as the region’s dominant power.

[2]
“I am the last Japan optimist,” Koll said in a recent speech in Tokyo.

[3]
Indeed, the once-common species has been virtually wiped out.
It was only two decades ago that Japan’s boosters —
mainly foreign diplomats and authors, economists and entrepreneurs —
touted the tiny nation as a global model
for how to attain prosperity and power.

[4]
But the group has turned gradually into non­believers,
with several of the last hold­outs losing faith only recently,
as Japan has failed to carry out meaningful reforms
after the March 2011 triple disaster.

[Let’s do a little reality check here.
Is Japan not prosperous?
It certainly is.
And its on-going trade surpluses (measured as current account surpluses)
give it great power,
as other nations, in particular the United States,
are highly dependent on Japan, along with China and other nations,
to continue to fund their on-going fiscal deficits
(for America, now in the fifth year of over a trillion dollars!).
Harlan asserts "reforms" are needed.
For what economic reason?]


[5]
The mass turnabout has helped launch an alternative —
and increasingly accepted — school of thought about Japan:
The country is not just in a prolonged slump but also in an inescapable decline.

[6]
There’s frequent evidence for that in economic data, and in the country’s destiny to become ever-smaller, doomed by demographics that will shrink the population from about 127 million today to 47 million in 2100, according to government data.

[7]
The current doom is a sharp reversal from several decades ago,
when Japanese companies bought up Columbia Pictures and Rockefeller Center,
and Americans argued whether Japan was to be feared or envied.

[8]
Like a separate but related group, known as “Japan bashers,”
the optimists were bullish about Japan’s future as an economic powerhouse.
But unlike the bashers,
who viewed Japan as a dangerous challenger to the United States,
the optimists saw Japan as a benevolent superpower —
rich but peaceful, with a diligence worth emulating.

[9]
Now, when Japan is discussed,
it’s instead for its unenviable fiscal problems —
debt, rising social security costs,
flagging trade with China because of an ongoing territorial dispute.

[Ah, but Japan's debt is owed mainly to its own citizens,
who have a savings rate far higher than the United States.]


[10]
China, not Japan, is mentioned in U.S. presidential debates
and described as the next threat to American supremacy.
Japan’s government has announced record quarterly trade deficits
while some of its iconic companies — Sony and Sharp —
have announced staggering losses.

[11]
By 2050,
Japan “will be the oldest society ever known,” with a median age of 52,
according to the recent book “Megachange,” published by the Economist magazine.
Even over the next decade,
Japan’s aging population will drag down the gross domestic product
by about 1 percent every year.
That will further strain Japan’s economy,
which in 2010 lost its status as the world’s second-largest,
a position now claimed by China.

[12]
“If you speak optimistically about Japan, nobody even believes it,” Koll said.
“They say, ‘Oh, in 600 years there will be 480 Japanese people left.
The Japanese are dying out and debt is piling up for future generations.’
Japan is an easy whipping boy.”

[That assumes Japan's current demographic trends continue.
But at any point Japanese women
(who by general agreement are the key decision-makers on the fertility rate)
could change that at any time, quite sharply,
and accelerate their production of their smart, talented children.]




Now a pessimist

[13]
Japan optimism became a mainstream movement
with the 1979 publication of “Japan As No. 1,”
an international bestseller that described
the way a country the size of Montana
had come to make cars as well as the Germans,
watches as well as the Swiss
and steel as well as the Americans —
in more efficient plants.
Japan’s people worked hard,
its government guided the economy,
and its streets were clean and crime-free.

[14]
“Japan has dealt more successfully with
more of the basic problems of post­industrial society
than any other country,”
wrote author Ezra Vogel, a sociologist at Harvard.

[I think to call Japan a "post-industrial society" is monumentally stupid --
cf. Fingleton's In Praise of Hard Industries for many examples,
not to mention the rafts of well-made high-tech Japanese products
so avidly sought by American upper-income consumers.
(Oh wait, Vogel is at Harvard. He's not stupid. Evidently just deceitful.).]


[15]
But Vogel, who has lived for several periods in Japan,
and has traveled here at least once a year since 1958,
says he, too, has become a pessimist.
Most Japanese still have a comfortable life, he says,
but the political system is “an absolute mess,”
juggling prime ministers almost every year.
[So?]
The youngest generation, its expectations sapped by years of deflation,
“doesn’t have the excitement about doing things better.”
[I think many of America's young people
would be quite happy if that was the most serious of their problems.]


[16]
Even the promise of lifetime employment
and tight cooperation between government and corporations
has backfired,
leaving a bureaucracy-enforced status quo
that makes it hard for established companies to reform
and for smaller, more creative companies to emerge.
[Japan is still running a great trade surplus with the U.S.
How much reform is needed?]


[17]
“What I did not foresee is that the slowdown would be such a challenge —
that many of the things that worked so well on the way up . . .
would be so difficult on the way down,” Vogel said.

[18]
Vogel, still a professor emeritus at Harvard,
says he has switched his focus in the past five years to China.



A disturbing trend

[19]
For more than a decade after Vogel’s book was published,
his predictions seemed prescient.
Between 1980 and 1990, Japan’s national wealth nearly tripled.
Real estate prices in downtown Tokyo skyrocketed so high
that analysts said the land under the Imperial Palace
was worth more than the state of California.
Japanese companies bought up American landmarks,
and some policymakers feared Japan was challenging U.S. supremacy,
particularly by using protectionist trade policies
that blocked American products.

[20]
Vogel credited Japan’s success in part to
its willingness to study others.
He described a nation obsessed with overseas travel:
Students went to American universities,
national sports coaches studied the training programs in other countries,
trade ministry bureaucrats went on missions to Europe to hone policies.
Japan even had programs in five foreign languages
available on its national television networks.

[21]
But today, former Japan optimists see a disturbing trend.
Fewer Japanese, they say, want to interact with the rest of the world,
and undergraduate enrollment of Japanese students at U.S. universities
has fallen more than 50 percent since 2000.
The generation now entering Japan’s job market
is described by older workers here as risk-averse and unambitious,
with security and comfort their top priorities.

[22]
“They have just given up trying to be number one”
said Yoichi Funabashi, former editor in chief of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper
and chairman of the Rebuild Japan Initiative.
“People think you just cannot beat China, so don’t even try.
But that’s bad, because
if you don’t train yourself on the international scene,
you don’t . . . sharpen your edge.
And you become more inward-looking.
There’s a sense in Japan that we are unprepared
to be a tough, competitive player in this global world.”

[Again, Japan is still running those trade surpluses.]

[23]
Japan is famous among historians for its sudden transformations,
re-engaging with the world in the mid-19th century
after two centuries of isolation,
later moving toward the militarism that helped launch World War II.
After the mega-disaster last year,
Japanese hoped for another transformation,
with the reconstruction of a tsunami-battered region
prompting a broader political and economic overhaul.

[24]
But Japanese increasingly feel that hasn’t happened,
according to a recent Pew Research Center poll.
Just 39 percent now say that last year’s disaster has made Japan a stronger country,
compared with 58 percent in a similar survey taken right after the earthquake and tsunami.
(According to the same survey, released in June,
93 percent of the Japanese public
describe the current state of the economy as bad.)



Preference for self-criticism

[25]
Global sentiment has swung so far against Japan,
the last few optimists now relish the chance to make a case on Japan’s behalf.

[26]
Although Japan is commonly thought to be a “Detroit-like zone”
with little chance for economic growth,
former Sony chief executive Nobuyuki Idei said in an interview,
the country still has a chance to prosper
if it can tap into Asia’s booming economies as a trade partner or investor.
Tokyo-based venture capitalist Yoshito Hori said that
Japan’s many strengths are often overlooked,
because Japanese prefer self-criticism to self-promotion.

[27]
“The value of Japan is, even when we do something good, we rarely say it,”
Hori said.

[28]
“When the Chinese achieve something, they say,
‘We have done this.’ ”
Japanese must learn to do the same, Hori said,
“otherwise, we will lose our position globally.”

[29]
That’s partly why Koll, a ­JPMorgan Japan manager,
decided this summer to give a TED talk —
the common name for a series of pop-education ­speeches —
in which he described his reasons for being the last optimist.

[30]
Japan has the world’s most competent financial regulator,
Koll said, and a per capita GDP several times that of China.
Real estate prices are back down to 1981 levels —
“wealth destruction has been tremendous,” he said —
but
Japan has weathered this
while still retaining its social cohesion and relative quality of life,
with an unemployment rate of just 4.2 percent.


[31]
But Koll also admitted in his speech that being bullish on Japan
is tantamount to saying Elvis is still alive.

[32]
“Things have changed,” he said.
“When I first got here,
I had conversations with people who said,
‘Oh, you’re so lucky to speak Japanese,
because we’ll all be working for the Japanese soon.’
You know, those are the things they’re saying about China now.”






2012-11-05-Fingleton-is-the-washington-post-racist-hillary-clinton
Is the Washington Post Racist?
by Eamonn Fingleton
http://www.forbes.com/sites/eamonnfingleton, 2012-11-05

[The emphasis is added.]

[1]
Is the Washington Post racist?
I ask the question in all seriousness.

[2]
Yes, I know that, at a conscious level,
the paper strives to do its best.
And, to its credit,
it has certainly been in the vanguard of efforts to make up for
the terrible disabilities once visited on American minorities.

[3]
But what about the paper’s subconscious?
Perhaps I shouldn’t attempt Freudian analysis here but
the question is prompted by
the paper’s constant misrepresentations
of the Japanese economy.

It is not an exaggeration to suggest that
the paper displays an almost pathological disdain for
the Japanese people’s economic achievements.

[4]
The Japanese invented the East Asian economic system,
which is now throughout East Asia
driving the largest industrial revolution in history.

And still to this day the Japanese version stands unchallenged as
the most sophisticated and effective
in its avowed aim of building national wealth.
This hits you between the eyes the moment you land in Japan:
as anyone who has been to the country in recent years can testify,
the Japanese have now leapt well ahead of the United States
in both living standards and national infrastructure.
And that is just the beginning of an amazing story
utterly at odds with
the myth of Japan’s so-called “lost decades.”


[5]
Yet the Post,
even more than the rest of the Western press,
seems to take an oafish delight
in portraying Japan as a basket case.
Here, for instance,
is a comment the other day
by the paper’s new Tokyo correspondent Chico Harlan:
“The current doom is a sharp reversal from several decades ago,
when Japanese companies bought up Columbia Pictures and Rockefeller Center.”

[6]
In citing the Columbia Pictures and Rockefeller Center purchases,
the Post is talking about a pattern of huge Japanese capital exports
which first became noticeable in the 1980s.
So that pattern has now undergone a “reversal”?
Actually, no.
The Post is hallucinating.
The truth is not only that
Japan has NOT suffered any diminution in its capital exports
but it has actually expanded them dramatically
during the so-called “lost decades.”
So much so that, as of the end of 2011,
Japan’s net external assets had reached more than $3.5 trillion,
up from a mere $293 billion at the end of 1989.
The fact is that Japan’s capital exports in the 1990s alone –
the first of the “lost decades” –
ran more than double the 1980s rate.
In the second “lost decade” (the ten years to 2009),
they ran even higher at more three times the 1980s rate.
Even in the wake of last year’s terrible earthquake,
Japan has been building its overseas assets
at a rate that would have seemed unbelievable in the 1980s.

[7]
Part of the reason you don’t hear more about this is that
the pattern of Japan’s asset buying has changed.
Whereas Japan in the 1980s made
some famously visible purchases of private sector U.S. assets,
latterly it has been concentrating almost entirely on
quietly investing in U.S. Treasury bonds and other foreign government securities.
Basically Japan is acting as a financial Atlas
propping up various foreign governments.
Without massive support from Japan
both the U.S. dollar and the British pound would long since have been vaporized.
Japan has been doing Trojan work also
shoring up the International Monetary Fund
in the latter’s efforts to bail out the bankrupt governments of the EU fringe.
As I have already pointed out at this site,
Japan in April was by far the largest non-European contributor
to an emergency fund to rescue the euro (with a contribution of $60 billion).

[8]
Underlying this trend is another fact that the Post,
in what can only be considered a manic effort to deny Japan’s achievements,
consistently sweeps under the carpet:
Japan’s trade surpluses have continued to burgeon.
It is worth remembering that
Japan was labeled an economic “juggernaut” in the 1980s
largely because of its success in racking up ever larger trade surpluses.
But it has done even better in succeeding decades.
Measured by the current account,
which is the widest and most meaningful yardstick of a nation’s trade
(it screens out the transfer pricing
that increasingly renders visible trade figures meaningless),
its surpluses in the 1980s totaled $418 billion;
in the 1990s $994 billion
and in the decade to 2009 fully $1,485 billion.
In 2010, the last year before the earthquake,
the current account reached $204 billion,
more than three times the 1989 figure of $63 billion.

[9]
Even in 2011 –
in the face of an earthquake which both severely depressed export output
and entailed huge emergency imports of oil –
Japan’s current account surplus totaled $119 billion.

[10]
At an industry level all this is evident in
the performance particularly of
Japan’s producers’ goods industries.
True,
some areas of the consumer electronics industry are not doing so well
but even the Japanese can’t win them all
(when I arrived in Japan in the mid 1980s the once-mighty steel corporations
were undergoing the same sort of strains now being visited on Sharp and Sony).
But even in an industry as mature as cars,
the Japanese have been doing remarkably well.
In the teeth of the earthquake, Toyota, for instance,
boasted sales last year of $259.5 billion,
more than three times its 1989 total of $84.1 billion.
Nissan meanwhile clocked $119.0 billion, also more than triple 1989.
Similarly the rest of the Japanese auto industry
has gone from strength to strength.
The same cannot be said for Detroit.
Ford Motor’s sales last year totaled $133.3 billion,
up a mere 44 percent on $92.4 billion in 1989.
General Motors’s sales were $150.3 billion,
up just 24 percent on $121.1 billion in 1989.
Not only have the Detroit companies retreated
in the face of Japanese advances in the American domestic market
but their European subsidiaries have also long been ceding share,
as have such European players as
Peugeot-Citroen, Volvo, Jaguar, and, of course, Renault.

[11]
In attempting to justify the absurd contention that Japan is facing “doom,”
the best the Post can do is
cite the Japanese people’s aging demographics.
This is a problem?
If so, it is one that many other nations would love to have.
After all, the “problem” stems largely from rising life expectancy.
Japanese citizens now live nearly five years longer than Americans,
whereas as recently as the late 1940s
their life expectancy was thirteen years shorter.
It is an epic demographic transformation and means, of course,
that there are a lot more old people around.
Would Japan be a more “successful” place
if its elderly citizens were being deep-sixed
at the speedier rates of mortality characteristic of the United States?
It seems the Post thinks so.

[While I agree with most everything else Mr. Fingleton says in this essay,
I strongly disagree with the assumptions of the next-to-last sentence above.
The figures, which are certainly well-known (e.g.),
in my opinion show that
America is spending far too much on the health care of its senior citizens.
Whether that money is being wisely spent, I sincerely doubt.
But the solution is not to keep spending more money on senior citizens.
Rather it is too sharply reduce
the overall amount being spent on their health care,
but to figure out a way to spend it more wisely.
But of course all this is tangential to the main points of the essay,
which concern Japan, not the United States.]


[12]
Of course, a low Japanese birth rate has also contributed.
But – in an overpopulated world – what is wrong that?
For some reason the Post seems to have failed to notice that
generally around the world
the richer and more educated a woman is,
the fewer children she is likely to have.
The correlation is notably illustrated in
the Forbes list of the world’s fifty most powerful women:
the top five —
Angela Merkel, Hillary Clinton, Dilma Rousseff, Melinda Gates, and Jill Abramson –
have a grand total of seven children.
In common with their peers elsewhere in the richest nations,
many Japanese women choose to have just one or two children.
It is a luxury they can afford.
To put it bluntly, unlike women in the developing world,
Japanese women no longer need look to a large family of children
for their economic security in old age.
They have plenty of savings.

[13]
In any case as a matter of top national policy,
the Japanese government has long actively sought to rein in the birthrate.
This is part of
a highly interventionist tradition of population control going back centuries.
As far back as the eighteenth century,
the Shoguns set an overall limit of 30 million on the nation’s population
and used sometimes draconian means to curb family sizes.
Then when Japan embarked on building an overseas empire in the late nineteenth century,
the policy was reversed.
With the government eager to populate
the nation’s ever-growing overseas possessions,
it encouraged families as large as nine or ten children.
The policy changed again after World War II
with the passing of the Eugenic Protection Acts of 1948 and 1949.
Shorn of its empire,
Japan suffered near-famine conditions in the first years after World War II.
Policymakers concluded that
the nation was grossly overpopulated and that
in the interests of food security
the birth rate had to be drastically cut.
This was in essence the forerunner of the one-child policy
that has become such a controversial aspect of Chinese policy in recent decades.
The difference is that in Japan’s case
the rationale for cutting the population was even greater.
After all, as is apparent from the CIA Factbook (available online),
Japan’s ratio of arable land per capita has long been one of the world’s lowest.

[14]
Let’s be fair.
The Post has some excuse for its negative view.
The fact is that
this view has long been encouraged by top Japanese leaders.
Working through
numberless surrogates in the American Japan-watching community,
they have projected an image of acute distress for two decades.
To say the least
such surrogates never mention
Japan’s booming capital exports or
Japanese exporters global dominance in producers’ goods.

Why keep the nation’s strengths under a bushel?
It is part of a counterintuitive approach to trade diplomacy.
Those of us with a long memory remember that
in an opinion poll in the “juggernaut Japan” era,
fully 58 percent of Americans said that
Japan’s rising strength was a greater threat to the United States
than the Soviet Union.
Up to that point the Japanese establishment had pursued a policy of
presenting the Japanese system as American capitalism on steroids.
Since then top leaders have discovered that
portraying the country as somehow sickly and almost farcically dysfunctional
is a much more effective way of restraining protectionist pressures abroad.
In the last few years, as the euro has weakened,
they have taken the program to new extremes
in an attempt to discourage hot money flowing into the yen
(they are concerned in particular that
the Germans now enjoy a currency edge in cars and producers’ goods).

[15]
None of this is surprising.
Japanese leaders after all have long pursued
an active program of shaping American opinion
to the advantage of Japanese trade policy.
What is surprising is that a paper of the caliber of the Washington Post
cannot see through the endless baloney about “malaise”
and dig out the facts for a change.

[Let me point out the obvious (which Mr. Fingleton seems to be to polite to observe):
Of course the Post can do what he suggested.
But they will not.
Now let me move into the subjective realm of
estimating the motivation for that refusal.
Ask yourself this question:
What ethnic group benefits from
an economy tilted toward health care, finance, and education
and away from manufacturing?
Surely it cannot be inappropriate just to ask a question, can it?]


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