2005-05-26

Think Tanks

Among the articles digested below, please note especially
A Modest Proposal” by Stephen M. Walt.


















Media-Transparency-AEI-Donors
Recipient Grants:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research


1991-07-WRMEA-WINEP
“Washington Institute for Near East Policy: An AIPAC ‘Image Problem’ ”
by Mark H. Milstein
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, July 1991
[cited in endnotes to Chapter 6 of ILUSFP]

2002-08-19-Whitaker
US thinktanks give lessons in foreign policy
by Brian Whitaker
The Guardian, 2002-08-19

[An excerpt; emphasis is added.]

“I see a parade of people from these institutes
coming through as talking heads [on cable TV].
I very seldom see a professor from a university on those shows,”
says Juan Cole, professor of history at Michigan University,
who is a critic of the private institutes.
“Academics [at universities]
are involved in analysing what’s going on
but they’re not advocates,
so they don’t have the same impetus,”
he said.
“The expertise on the Middle East that exists in the universities
is not being utilised, even for basic information.”

Of course, very few academics
have agents like Eleana Benador to promote their work
and very few are based in Washington -
which can make arranging TV appearances,
or rubbing shoulders with state department officials a bit difficult.

Those who work for US thinktanks
are often given university-style titles
such as “senior fellow”, or “adjunct scholar”,
but their research is very different from that of universities -
it is entirely directed towards shaping government policy.

What nobody outside the thinktanks knows, however, is
who pays for this policy-shaping research.

Under US law, large donations
given to non-profit, “non-partisan” organisations such as thinktanks
must be itemised in their annual “form 990” returns to the tax authorities.
But the identity of donors does not need to be made public.

The AEI, which deals with many other issues besides the Middle East,
had assets of $35.8m (£23.2m) and an income of $24.5m in 2000,
according to its most recent tax return.
It received seven donations of $1m or above in cash or shares,
the highest being $3.35m.

The Washington Institute [for Near East Policy],
which deals only with Middle East policy,
had assets of $11.2m and an income of $4.1m in 2000.
The institute says its donors are identifiable because they are also its trustees, but the list of trustees contains 239 names
which makes it impossible to distinguish large benefactors from small ones.

...

The Washington Institute is considered
the most influential of the Middle East thinktanks,
and the one that the state department takes most seriously.
Its director is the former US diplomat, Dennis Ross {who is Jewish].

Besides publishing books and placing newspaper articles,
the institute has a number of other activities
that for legal purposes do not constitute lobbying,
since this would change its tax status.

It holds lunches and seminars, typically about three times a week,
where ideas are exchanged and political networking takes place.
It has also given testimony to congressional committees
nine times in the last five years.

Every four years, it convenes a “bipartisan blue-ribbon commission”
known as the Presidential study group,
which presents a blueprint for Middle East policy to the newly-elected president.

The institute makes no secret of its extensive links with Israel,
which currently include the presence of two scholars from the Israeli armed forces.

Israel is an ally and the connection is so well known that
officials and politicians take it into account when dealing with the institute.
But it would surely be a different matter
if the ally concerned were a country such as Egypt, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia.

Apart from occasional lapses ...
the Washington Institute typically represents
the considered, sober voice of American-Israeli conservatism.

The Middle East Forum is its strident voice -
two different tones, but mostly the same people.

Three prominent figures from the Washington Institute -
Robert Satloff (director of policy),
Patrick Clawson (director of research) and
[Michael] Rubin (prolific writer, currently at AEI) -
also belong to the forum.

Daniel Pipes, the bearded $100,000-a-year head of the forum
is listed as an “associate” at the institute,
while Mr Kramer, editor of the forum's journal, is a “visiting fellow”.

2004-08-30-Cole-on-WINEP
AIPAC's Overt and Covert Ops
by Juan Cole
Antiwar.com, 2004-08-30

[An excerpt (emphasis is added).]

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee is a lobbying group
that used to support whatever government was in power in Israel,
and used to give money evenhandedly inside the U.S.
My perception [and that of many other observers]
is that during the past decade
AIPAC has increasingly tilted to the Likud in Israel,
and to the political Right in the United States.
In the 1980s,
AIPAC set up the Washington Institute for Near East Policy as
a pro-Israeli alternative to the Brookings Institution,
which it perceived to be insufficiently supportive of Israel.

WINEP has largely followed AIPAC into pro-Likud positions,
even though its director, Dennis Ross, is more moderate.
He is a figurehead, however, serving to disguise
the far right character of most of the position papers
produced by long-term WINEP staff and by extremist visitors and “associates”
(Daniel Pipes and Martin Kramer are among the latter).

WINEP, being a wing of AIPAC, is enormously influential in Washington.
State Department and military personnel are actually detailed there to
“learn” about “the Middle East”!
They would get a far more balanced “education” about the region
in any Israeli university,
since most Israeli academics are professionals,
whereas WINEP is a “think tank” that hires by ideology.

I did some consulting with one U.S. company that had a government contract,
and they asked me about WINEP position papers
(many of them are just propaganda).
When I said I would take them with a grain of salt, the guy said
his company had “received direction”
to pay a lot of attention to the WINEP material!

So discipline is being imposed even on the private sector.

...

WINEP supplies right-wing intellectuals to Republican administrations,
who employ their positions to
support Likud policies from within the U.S. government.
They have the advantage over longtime civil servants
in units like the State Department's Intelligence and Research division,
insofar as they are politically connected and so
have the ear of the top officials.


2006-11-17-Bovard
The Torturous Servility of Washington Think Tanks
by Jim Bovard

2003-04-06-Beinin
Pro-Israel Hawks and the Second Gulf War
by Joel Beinin
Middle East Report, 2003-04-06

[An excerpt:]

The establishment
of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) in 1985
greatly expanded the [Israel] lobby’s influence over policy as well.
WINEP’s founding director, Martin Indyk,
had previously been research director of AIPAC
which, then as now, focuses much of its efforts on Congress.
Indyk developed WINEP into
a highly effective think tank devoted to
maintaining and strengthening the US-Israel alliance
through advocacy in the media and lobbying the executive branch.


On the eve of the 1988 presidential elections [Bush/Dukakis],
with the first Palestinian intifada underway,
WINEP made its bid
to become a major player in US Middle East policy discussions
by issuing a report entitled
“Building for Peace: An American Strategy for the Middle East.”
The report urged the incoming administration to
“resist pressures for a procedural breakthrough
[on Palestinian-Israeli peace issues]
until conditions have ripened.”

Six members of the study group responsible for the report
joined the first Bush administration,
which adopted this stalemate recipe
not to change until change was unavoidable.
Hence,
the US acceded to
Israel’s refusal to negotiate
with the Palestine Liberation Organization

despite the PLO’s recognition of Israel

at the November 1988 session of the Palestine National Council.

After the 1991 Gulf War, the first Bush administration
felt obliged to offer a reward to its Arab wartime allies
by making an effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.
It convened a one-day international conference at Madrid in October
followed by eleven sessions of bilateral Palestinian-Israeli negotiations
in Washington.
These talks were fruitless, in part because
Israel still refused to negotiate
with Palestinians who were official representatives of the PLO.

Then, as now,
Israel preferred to choose the Palestinians with whom it would negotiate.
[Such arrogance!
And they get away with it, without the slightest criticism from Washington.]


When Israel became serious
about attempting to reach an agreement with the Palestinians,
it circumvented the US-sponsored negotiations in Washington
(and the pro-Israel lobby)
and spoke directly to representatives of the PLO in Oslo.
The result was the 1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles.
Thus, the adoption of WINEP’s policy recommendation to
“resist pressures for a procedural breakthrough”
by both the Bush and Clinton administrations
delayed the start of meaningful Israeli-Palestinian negotiations,
contributed to the demonization of the PLO and
multiplied the casualty rate of the first Palestinian intifada.

...

The Clinton administration was
even more thoroughly colonized by WINEP associates
than its predecessor [Bush-41].

...

Where WINEP and AIPAC tend to hew to the line of
whichever Israeli government is in power,
JINSA associates align themselves with
the territorial ambitions of the Israeli right.

2007-08-03-Lobe
AEI: Caught Between Its Likudist Heart and Its Corporate Head
by Jim Lobe
LobeLog.com, 2007-08-03

[This raises a point that has long been of interest:
If the AEI is really funded by corporations,
why does it take positions so associated with Israel’s hard-line extremists?]
















2009


2009-11-20-Walt-a-modest-proposal-for-disclosure
A Modest Proposal
by Stephen M. Walt
walt.foreignpolicy.com, 2009-11-20

...

[I]s there any way to clean up
the marketplace of ideas here in the United States?


We are drowning in information and opinion,
much of it claiming to be objective and authoritative
when it may in fact be inspired and funded by moneyed special interests
eager to sell the public a story that advances their particular objectives.
Most “think tanks” in Washington portray themselves as
objective, quasi-scholarly institutions
(indeed, they increasingly give researchers
endowed chairs and other quasi-academic titles),
but unlike most universities,
most think tanks remain heavily dependent on “soft money”
and are bound to be
especially sensitive to what potential donors might be thinking.
And some of them aren’t really scholarly at all;
they are just public relations operations or “letterhead organizations”
seeking to mold public opinion
and push the policy process in a particular direction.
But
unless you know who’s paying for it,
it’s hard to decide who’s giving you an honest opinion
and who is just shilling for some powerful interest group.


Can we tame this beast without infringing on free speech?

Here’s a suggestion:
let’s start by asking participants in the war of ideas
to provide a lot more information about their financial dealings.

The SEC requires companies
to make relevant financial information available
to investors;
why shouldn’t those who provide information in the public arena
provide a similar level of disclosure
to those who “invest” in their alleged expertise?

We don’t have to pass a law requiring think tanks or pundits
to disclose the details of their funding arrangements to the public;
as a first step,
we could simply rank different organizations and individuals
on the level of disclosure they provide,
much as other groups help potential donors rate charitable organizations
on their administrative efficiency.

For example, think tanks could be ranked
according to their willingness to provide lists of their funding sources,
specifying both the sources of the funding
and the specific projects that the donors paid for.
Wouldn’t you like to know who is bankrolling the
American Enterprise Institute, Cato Institute, Heritage Foundation,
Center for American Progress, Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Brookings Institution, Council on Foreign Relations,
Hudson Institute, Middle East Institute, Foreign Policy Initiative,
Institute for the Study of War, the Federation of American Scientists,
or the New America Foundation?

...

2009-12-04-Walt-transparency-international-disclosure
Transparency International?
by Stephen M. Walt
walt.foreignpolicy.com, 2009-12-04
















2010


2010-06-17-Flynn-Surge-of-Ideas
‘The Surge of Ideas’
by Michael Flynn
Antiwar.com, 2010-06-17

EARLY THIS YEAR,
Gen. David Petraeus, head of U.S. Central Command,
spoke at a public event in Washington, D.C.,
about the situation in Iraq and
the priorities of the U.S. military in the greater Middle East.[1]
The event was hosted by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW),
a think tank led by Kimberly Kagan —
spouse of the neoconservative writer Frederick Kagan
...

[This article is cited and commented on at length
here at Patrick Lang’s blog.]



































2012

2012-12-19-WP-Kagan-Petraeus-civilian-analysts-gained-petraeuss-ear-while-he-was-commander-in-afghanistan
Civilian analysts gained Petraeus’s ear while he was commander in Afghanistan
By Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post, 2012-12-19

[A look at how Frederick and Kimberly Kagan,
both affiliated to think tanks,
gained the ear of the American Afghan-war commanders]















2014

2014-09-07-NYT-foreign-powers-buy-influence-at-think-tanks
Foreign Powers Buy Influence at Think Tanks
By ERIC LIPTON, BROOKE WILLIAMS and NICHOLAS CONFESSORE
New York Times, 2014-09-07

2014-09-19-Walt-hacks_and_hired_guns_washington_think_tank_foreign_funding
Hacks and Hired Guns
Are America’s think tanks in hock to the highest bidder?
by Stephen M. Walt
foreignpolicy.com, 2014-09-19

Labels: ,

2005-02-01

Washington Metro

2016-04-25-WP-metro-sank-into-crisis-despite-decades-of-warnings
Metro sank into crisis despite decades of warnings
By Robert McCartney and Paul Duggan
Washington Post, 2016-04-25 (Monday)

[This was a five-column banner story at the top of page 1.]

[Washington] Metro’s failure-prone subway
once considered a transportation jewel —
is mired in disrepair because the transit agency neglected to heed warnings that its aging equipment and poor safety culture would someday lead to chronic breakdowns and calamities.

For nearly half a century, almost since construction of the subway system began, federal experts, civic and business groups, private transit organizations, and some Metro general managers and directors have raised red flags.

The alarms came repeatedly, at public hearings and Metro board meetings, in crash investigations and published studies, including 14 reports reviewed for this article: The agency lacked a robust institutional safety consciousness, its maintenance regime was close to negligent, and the system desperately needed a steadier, more dependable source of financing.

But generations of executives and government-appointed Metro board members, along with Washington-area politicians who ultimately dictated Metro’s spending and direction, steered the agency on a different course.

“America’s subway,” which opened in 1976 to great acclaim — promoted as a marvel of modern transit technology and design — has been reduced to an embarrassment, scorned and ridiculed from station platforms to the halls of Congress. Balky and unreliable on its best days, and hazardous, even deadly, on its worst, Metrorail is in crisis, losing riders and revenue and exhausting public confidence.

Thousands of pages of documents and dozens of interviews show that the decline of Metro is a story about head-in-the-sand leadership through its history, about political inertia and timidity among the multiple jurisdictions that govern the agency, about fateful misjudgments in strategic planning, and about cautions ignored or underestimated while the subway grew older and rot set in, just as the warnings had predicted.

...


2016-05-02-WP-fta-safety-inspectors-uncover-more-track-defects-that-metro-missed
FTA safety inspectors uncover more track defects that Metro missed
By Robert McCartney and Lori Aratani
Washington Post, 2016-05-02 (Lead story in Washington print edition)

...

Metro inspectors had overlooked the defect — which could cause a derailment —
in nine visual inspections in the preceding month, federal officials said.

...

Asked in an interview why Metro had not identified the track defects
before the [Federal Transit Administration] review,
[U.S. Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx] answered simply,
“They weren’t looking.”

He continued: “Our teams have been in that system for several months,
but really the rate of inspections in these months
has been more than they’ve had for quite some time.
That in itself is troubling.”

Asked whether Metro was simply not doing the inspections,
or instead was failing to do them thoroughly,
Foxx answered, “Yes” — implying that both were true.

...


2016-05-04-WP-ntsb-report-on-fatal-2015-metro-smoke-incident-is-said-to-criticize-metro-first-responders-and-others
NTSB cites ‘ineffective inspection and maintenance practices’ as causes of fatal 2015 Metro smoke incident
By Paul Duggan and Lori Aratani
Washington Post, 2016-05-04

Metro’s long history of deficiencies — including poor maintenance, a loose safety culture, a blindness to potential hazards and a chronic failure to learn from previous disasters — all contributed to last year’s deadly smoke crisis in a Yellow Line tunnel, federal officials said Tuesday in a report that reads like an indictment of the beleaguered transit agency.

“To me, this shows that [Metro], historically speaking, has had a severe learning disability,” Robert L. Sumwalt, a member of the National Transportation Safety Board, said at a public hearing as the board finalized a report of its inquiry into the Jan. 12, 2015, smoke incident, which killed one train rider and sickened scores of others.

“Quite simply, they have not been willing to learn from prior events,” Sumwalt said. “Learning disabilities are tragic in children, but they are fatal in organizations. And literally that is true in this case.”

...

The NTSB also took a deep dive into Metro’s history, describing the L’Enfant Plaza crisis as a product of the transit agency’s decades-long record of shortcomings.

The report “reinforces obviously what I’ve been trying to do since day one, which is changing the culture,” said Metro General Manager Paul J. Wiedefeld, who took charge of the transit agency in late November. “We have to get infrastructure correct; we have to get the policies right; we have to get the people right.”

He said: “How has this gone on for 30 years? I think that’s the big takeaway here.”

...

And board members echoed their recommendation, first made last year, that Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx urge Congress to shift responsibility for Metro safety oversight from the Federal Transit Administration to the Federal Railroad Administration, which the NTSB said has greater enforcement power.

They noted that trains hauling freight have more regulation than Metro, which carries hundreds of thousands of passengers a year.

Mark Jones, a veteran NTSB official who investigated the 2009 Red Line crash near Metro’s Fort Totten station that killed nine people, said he thought that calamity would lead to more regulation of U.S. subway systems.

“I thought Fort Totten would be a game changer,” Jones said. “. . . But there’s still no regulation, and as we sit here today, a coal train operating anywhere in this country has a lot more regulation than a Metro train does.”

NTSB Chairman Christopher A. Hart also had harsh words for the FTA, saying its efforts to oversee the safety of Metro’s rail system continue to fall short and noting that the agency had made recommendations that are “unenforceable.”

“WMATA needs a regulatory structure with rules, inspections and enforcement,” Hart said. “The FRA can provide all three.”

Foxx has declined to follow the recommendation, and his spokeswoman, Namrata Kolachalam, reacted sharply Tuesday to the renewed call for the change.

“One would think that [Foxx] could flip a switch and move safety oversight to the FRA,” she said in a statement.
“We can’t. That’s the whole point we’ve been making.
We find the NTSB’s continued fixation with FRA oversight confounding and counterproductive.
Given the urgency of the safety issues with [Metro],
is it better to draft legislation, send it to Congress, and hope they would act?”

As members of the Washington area’s congressional delegation reacted to the report, Rep. Gerald E. Connolly (D-Va.) also called for FRA oversight, saying that the NTSB report “once again clearly made the compelling case” for the proposed shift.

But Rep. Don Beyer (D-Va.) sided with Foxx. “My instinct is that Secretary Foxx made the decision to avoid internal battles, and I respect that,” Beyer said. “I think if it doesn’t work in six months, a year, we can always change that.”

[Oh, so "internal battles" are the problem.
Well, I'm sure almost any plan for action or change will bring about some sort of internal battles.
But ...
I find this something new.
The NTSB is a non-partisan, non-ideological board.
It has no known, to me, ideological agenda, bias, or slant.
It is a technocratic board trying to ensure the most effective possible management structure.
Rep. Beyer thinks we should wait until the next Metro calamity to switch to the more rigorous oversight of the FRA.
Given the history of Metro documented above, that seems like a poor call.
What is the problem with FRA oversight, please?
Is it the "internal battles" Rep. Beyer predicts,
or the delay in making the switch to FRA oversight the spokeswoman for Secretary Foxx wrote about?]


...


2016-05-05-WP-one-of-ntsbs-key-recommendations-for-improving-metro-unlikely-to-go-anywhere
One of NTSB’s key recommendations for improving Metro unlikely to go anywhere
By Robert McCartney and Paul Duggan
Washington Post, 2016-05-05

Congress is unlikely to strengthen safety oversight of Metro as urged by the National Transportation Safety Board because of political and practical objections including stout opposition from the Obama administration, officials said Wednesday.

In a scathing public hearing Tuesday, the NTSB ratcheted up pressure for shifting responsibility of safety oversight of Metro from the transit branch of the Department of Transportation to its railroad branch.

The NTSB strongly restated its “urgent” recommendation from September to transfer such oversight from the Federal Transit Administration to the Federal Railroad Administration. It complained that the FTA’s oversight was only temporary and that the FRA had greater expertise, regulatory powers and resources to do the job.

...

[Rep. Gerald E. Connolly (D-Va.)], despite agreeing with the NTSB on the issue, has not proposed legislation to require shifting responsibility from the FTA to the FRA. He said in a statement Wednesday that he would not sponsor such a bill unless Foxx requests it.








2016-08-08-WP-in-scathing-report-fta-blasts-metro-track-maintenance-program
In scathing report, FTA blasts Metro track maintenance program
By Martine Powers and Faiz Siddiqui
Washington Post, 2016-08-08: August 8 at 3:13 PM

A new Federal Transit Administration report blasts Metro’s track inspection and repair protocol for “systemic safety deficiencies” and issued 12 corrective actions that Metro must take to overhaul its track maintenance program.

Among the problems cited by the FTA: Metro officials knew of problems, but did not shut down the section of track involved in the July 29 derailment because they needed it for single-tracking as part of SafeTrack surges involving the Orange and Silver Lines.

The 36-page report and corrective actions issued are the result of months of investigations into Metro’s track maintenance practices, and outline systemic problems with the protocol used to conduct routine repairs and track work – issues that became even more apparent late last month when a Silver Line train derailed just outside of East Falls Church station.

[Read the FTA report here]

The issues with an interlocking where that train derailed were known to Metro officials, but the track was not taken out of service because it was used as a transfer point for trains during SafeTrack, the Federal Transit Administration said in a report slated to be released Monday.

“These conditions clearly exceeded allowable safety parameters specified in [Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s] track safety standards, and were not found or addressed by WMATA personnel prior to the derailment,” the FTA wrote.

FTA “encouraged WMATA to include this track in its SafeTrack program, and specifically to prioritize work between East Falls Church to Ballston, as one of the first three SafeTrack surges,” the agency said in its report on Metro’s track integrity. “The particular interlocking involved in the derailment was not part of this initial surge because it was used to support single tracking operations.”

FTA, which assumed safety oversight for Metro’s rail operations in October, said components on the segment of track from Vienna to Ballston “are reaching the end of their useful life.”

...

In its report, FTA also issued a scathing analysis of Metro’s track inspections, finding that the agency’s track maintenance program doesn’t allow inspectors enough time to make needed fixes, and fails to account for variances in track types, environments and volume of train traffic. FTA said Metro’s maintenance manual “contains outdated references, confusing and conflicting information on tracks standards and requirements and does not clearly specify minimum safety standards.”

“As a consequence, the procedure for WMATA track inspectors and supervisors to use the Manual to assess track conditions and clearly identify which conditions warrant speed restrictions is not well understood by track inspectors or track supervisors,” the FTA said.

The FTA concluded that Metro’s track inspectors needed further training and mentoring to address deficiencies in knowledge and experience.

[Here is FTA’s safety directive]

In the accompanying safety directive, the agency outlined 12 specific required actions, which include: developing additional training and certification for track inspections, establishing a new track inspection schedule, adding personnel to the roster of employees tasked with conducting inspections, revising the inspection manual, and developing formal procedures on how to report and prioritize issues with tracks that need immediate attention.

Metro has 30 days to respond to the report, and 60 days to come up with a plan on how they will execute the prescribed actions.





2016-08-24-WP-fight-over-fired-mechanic-shows-how-union-metro-management-deserve-each-other
Fight over fired mechanic shows how union, Metro management deserve each other
By Fredrick Kunkle
Washington Post, 2016-08-24

...

The dispute over the mechanic’s firing begins in January 2015, after a Yellow Line train stalled in a smoke-filled tunnel near L’Enfant Plaza and became engulfed in the noxious fumes. One person died, and dozens were sickened.

In the aftermath, investigators discovered that a circuit board for one of the fans that removed smoke from the Yellow Line tunnel had burned out. It was also discovered that Seyoum Haile, a senior mechanic, had falsified preventive maintenance inspection reports on the fan, court documents say. When confronted with discrepancies in those inspection reports during the post-accident investigation, Haile also lied, Metro’s management says. In court documents, Metro accused Haile of failing to discover a latent problem with the circuit board that could impair its functioning during an emergency. So it canned him on Feb. 17, 2015, in the name of keeping Metro safe.

But the story is more complex than that. And the union is on to something when it argues that Haile, who had been employed with the agency for 13 years, had only been following routine procedure in a workplace where management fostered incompetence and allowed people to make stuff up as they went along.

...

During arbitration proceedings, Metro produced evidence that Haile was supposed to have inspected the tunnel fan and tested its operation on three different occasions in September, October and November 2014. But computer records cited by Metro showed that the the fan had not been operated — either by local or remote control — on those occasions. Metro says Haile submitted six false maintenance reports about those inspections and lied about them during the post-accident investigation.

...

A deeper look at the documents shows why the arbitrator would eventually rule that Haile’s dismissal was excessive. On page after page, the documents show that Haile was not some employee who was pretending to conduct inspections on fans. But he had been going about his work in haphazard fashion and failing to document inspection reports for some time, all with the tacit blessing of superiors.

The reason for this was that the practice of running fan tests — and heaven knows what else at Metro — had become so inefficient and sloppy that Haile and other mechanics did not always conduct their inspections in a systematic way or fill out their maintenance reports properly.

During these inspections, the mechanics operated the fans from nearby switches or by remote control. When mechanics wanted to run a test remotely, they had to contact Metro’s Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC). The ROCC staff sometimes put the mechanics on hold, failed to call back, or had trouble locating the correct switch for the fans in question.

On one of the last inspections Haile and a co-worker conducted on the fan before the fatal Yellow Line incident, he was heard in the background on an audio recording respectfully trying to help the ROCC official locate the right switch. But the ROCC operator couldn’t find it and hung up. He and his coworker went to work on another fan but did not return to the original one.

These fan tests could last as long as 10 minutes or as little as three minutes. But sometimes Haile and other mechanics had to wait for hours to conduct a test or even come back a day later to complete the inspections – and leave part of their inspection reports blank until then.

In fact, Haile’s supervisor, Nicholas Perry, acknowledged in arbitration testimony that he gave out pre-signed inspection reports to his crew. The forms said “reviewed by a supervisor,” even if that were not the case, a practice Perry testified that he has since discontinued.

Perry also testified that Haile’s inspection documents weren’t properly filled out for an eight-month period – from January until August 2014. But Perry also testified that he hadn’t noticed this until sometime in September or October. It was only then that Perry asked Haile to come in and fill in the blanks.

...

Haile wasn’t even in the country the last time the Yellow Line fan was tested before the Jan. 12, 2015 smoke incident. That was done by two other employees in December — and their inspection reports also didn’t match ROCC testing records. One of the workers was disciplined after the deadly event with a three-day suspension; the other wasn’t disciplined at all.

In other words, neither employees nor their supervisors seemed greatly concerned about ensuring that the tunnel fans were inspected in a systematic fashion, and their routine for doing so was so slapdash that it might seem funny if not for the consequences. Metro knew this and apparently did next to nothing about it until someone died.

On April 8, the arbitration board issued its ruling. Instead of being fired, Borchini held that Haile should be suspended without pay for 180 days — hardly a slap on the wrist. As part of his reasoning, the arbitrator cited Metro’s “systemic maintenance practices.”

...

[My thought:
Okay, so maybe Haile wasn't the only one who failed to do his duty.
But that doesn't excuse what he did.
If Metro wants to give a clear signal that falsifying inspection reports will no longer be tolerated,
I don't see why they shouldn't be allowed to give that signal.]



2016-12-15-WP-metro-fires-six-employees-after-derailment-probe-reveals-inspectors-falsified-records
Metro fires six after derailment probe finds that inspectors falsified records
By Faiz Siddiqui and Martine Powers
Washington Post, 2016-12-15

Metro fired six workers after determining that nearly half of the agency’s 60-person track-inspection department created a pattern of fabrication and negligence that led to the derailment of a Silver Line train in July, the transit agency said Thursday.

The fired employees falsified track-inspection records for as long as three years, officials said. A criminal investigation ended without charges, but the findings of Metro’s internal review have been sent to prosecutors to decide whether to pursue other legal action.

Six more terminations or suspensions are pending and a total of 28 workers received disciplinary action, Metro said.

“This review revealed a disturbing level of indifference, lack of accountability and flagrant misconduct in a portion of Metro’s track department, which is completely intolerable,” Metro General Manager Paul J. Wiedefeld said in a statement. “It is reprehensible that any supervisor or midlevel manager would tolerate or encourage this behavior, or seek to retaliate against those who objected.”

The review showing negligence and falsification represents the most damning indictment of Metro’s lack of safety culture since nine people died in a 2009 crash on the Red Line.

The National Transportation Safety Board and others have repeatedly faulted Metro for placing a lower priority on safety than on earning revenue by keeping the trains running. But evidence had not emerged that workers were involved in systematic efforts at deception that put riders’ lives at risk.

Wiedefeld’s decision to fire the workers and announce the discipline publicly also represents his highest-profile attempt to change Metro’s safety culture since he took over about a year ago.

...






2017

2017-01-26-WP-one-third-of-metros-track-inspection-department-has-been-fired-for-falsifying-records
One-third of Metro’s track inspection department has been fired for falsifying records, Wiedefeld confirms
By Martine Powers and Faiz Siddiqui
Washington Post, 2017-01-26

Metro General Manager Paul J. Wiedefeld confirmed Thursday that
he has now fired 21 members of the agency’s track inspection department
as part of an investigation into falsified inspection records.

Wiedefeld told members of the Metro board safety committee that
the terminations include 16 track inspectors and five supervisors —
about one-third of the existing department.
Fourteen other workers have also been disciplined as part of the investigation, which began last August and is now concluded.

Though the investigation was prompted by a derailment near East Falls Church in July,
Wiedefeld acknowledged Thursday that
most of the firings had nothing to do with
the stretch of defective tracks that caused the derailment.
Instead, he said, investigators believe they uncovered inspection reports
that were falsified for other parts of the Silver Line,
rather than the specific crossover where the derailment occurred.
He did not say whether inspection records were found to be falsified on other lines of the system.

“They were systemic issues we were having in that department,” he said.

The investigation placed a particularly close focus on
the role of supervisors in the alleged falsifications.
Wiedefeld fired nearly half of his staff of track inspection supervisors,
five out of a team of 12.
He said there is no evidence that there was any falsification of attendance records or time sheets,
and the employees’ alleged wrongdoing did not rise to the level of criminal charges.

...

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2005-01-04

Washington DC sports scene

2018-08-24

Those interested in the Washington Nationals National League Major League Baseball team might be interested in this story.
Unfortunately, the main link to it is at the AP web site, and such links have a habit of only being temporary.
So I'll excerpt some of the AP story here.
It's an interview with Matt Adams, who was just moved from the Washington Nationals to the St. Louis Cardinals.

Red-hot Cardinals go from slumping to soaring in dog days
by Beth Harris, 2018-08-23 (at the AP web site)
same story, at the WP web site:
Red-hot Cardinals go from slumping to soaring in dog days
by Beth Harris, 2018-08-23 (at the WP web site)

LOS ANGELES (AP) — Matt Adams could see something special going on with the St. Louis Cardinals from the opposing side of the field with the Washington Nationals.

He recognized the solid pitching and timely hitting that have made the Cardinals baseball’s hottest team in the dog days of August. So Adams couldn’t believe his luck when he found out St. Louis had claimed him off waivers earlier this week.

The move brings Adams back to the organization that drafted him in 2009.
More importantly, he’s on a team that has gone from wild-card hopeful to threatening the NL Central-leading Cubs.

“They’re playing with a fire and taking every pitch like it’s the last pitch they’ll ever play,” Adams said.
“How they go about their daily business is something special to watch.”

...

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